Adult attachment and mental health : the mediation role of emotion regulation by Haner, Morgynn Lynn
DISCLAIMER:	  This	  document	  does	  not	  meet	  the current	  format	  guidelines	  of 
the Graduate	  School	  at	  	  The	  University	  of	  Texas	  at	  Austin.	  It	  has	  been	  published	  for	  informational	  use	  only.	  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
by 
Morgynn Lynn Haner 
2018 
 
 
  
The Dissertation Committee for Morgynn Lynn Haner Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following Dissertation:  
 
Adult Attachment and Mental Health: The Mediating Role of Emotion 
Regulation 
 
 
 
Committee: 
 
 
 
 
Germine Awad, Supervisor 
 
 
 
Stephanie Rude  
 
 
 
Ricardo Ainslie  
 
 
 
Aprile Benner 
 
 
 
Nancy Hazen-Swann 
 
 
 
 
Adult Attachment and Mental Health: The Mediating Role of Emotion 
Regulation 
 
 
by 
Morgynn Lynn Haner 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
December, 2018 
Dedication 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to Patty and James Geer. I love you more than you can 
know, and I’ll always be your girl. Thank you for making me who I am, and for making 
this all possible.   
 
 
 
 v 
Acknowledgements 
 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the members of my committee. Dr. 
Hazen-Swann provided her expertise in attachment, for which without I would have been 
lost. Dr. Awad generously served as my chair and demonstrated to me what it really 
means to integrate social and cultural variables into clinical research. She doesn’t know 
this, but her natural balance of intelligence, character, and personality have long made her 
one of my role models.   
Dr. Benner’s integrity as a researcher will always influence the way I approach 
my own work. She taught me structural equation modeling, time and time again, and held 
me to the highest standards as a statistician while still answering my most basic of 
questions. She is also responsible for the final skill I learned in graduate school: How to 
create proper structural models on a computer, effectively (and justly) putting an end to 
my illegible models that I hand drew on stray pieces of paper I found at the bottom of my 
purse.  
Dr. Ainslie, who has known me for nearly a decade, challenged me to immerse 
myself in the attachment literature and made sure I knew how to pronounce “Bowlby,” 
which will certainly save me from future embarrassment. Beyond this, Dr. Ainslie served 
as a mentor to me throughout my time in graduate school. Working on his latest 
documentary was an experience I will never forget, and an important part of my decision 
to pursue a career working with veterans. Being on his research team gave me a sense of 
belonging when I felt like an outsider. I’ll never forget what he said to me years ago 
when I needed it most: “Don’t let the bastards get you down.” I won’t.  
 vi 
Dr. Rude was, and remains, the best mentor, supervisor, and collaborator I could 
have hoped for. She saw something in me that I did not see in myself, and she was patient 
with me as I grew from a confused, self-doubting girl into a competent and confident 
woman. I would not be writing this now if it weren’t for her unwavering faith in me and 
her dedication to my growth as a person and professional. When I lost my way, she didn’t 
give me a map. Rather, she waited patiently for me to find my own way back, all along 
reminding me she had no doubt that I would. I was fortunate enough to be her last student 
and gracious final recipient of her passion for science, and I will always strive to embody 
the knowledge and values she passed on to me. I am certain we will be writing papers 
together for years to come, or at least until she tires of my need to routinely present our 
work half way around the world.  
Thank you to my parents—two of the most patient and kind human beings I’ve 
ever known. I’ll never forget how you let me determine my own future, how you let me 
embrace my independence, and how you never doubted this day would come. You saw 
through my teenaged rebellion and you knew that I needed to express that part of myself 
in order to become who I am today. I love you.  
Last but absolutely not least, I am grateful to Phillip—the love of my life and the 
ship that kept me afloat throughout these six years. Thank you for loving me 
unconditionally, for waking me up when I slept through all six of my alarms, for making 
me dinner when I was too exhausted to move, and for always, always reminding me that I 
am capable of doing whatever it is that I want to do. I’ve felt lucky every day of my life 
since I met you.  
 
 
 
 vii 
Abstract 
 
Adult Attachment and Mental Health: The Mediating Role of Emotion 
Regulation  
 
Morgynn Lynn Haner, Ph.D.  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Germine Awad 
 
It is well established in the literature that attachment style is related to mental 
health. However, theory and research suggest that attachment style does not exert its 
influence on adults’ mental health directly, but rather that it influences mental health due 
to its influence on a number of mediating variables. The current study tested the 
hypothesis that emotion regulation mediates the link between adult attachment and 
mental health. Five hundred and eighty-five college undergraduates completed an online 
survey consisting of measures of attachment style, rumination, experiential avoidance, 
perspective taking, distress, and wellbeing. Structural equation models tested hypotheses 
and perspective taking partially mediated the relationship between attachment anxiety 
and distress. With replications, these findings suggest promoting adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies in anxiously attached adults.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
It is well established in the literature that attachment style is related to mental 
health. However, theory and research suggest that attachment style does not exert its 
influence on adults’ mental health directly, but rather that it influences mental health due 
to its influence on a number of mediating variables, like emotion regulation (Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2007). Since attachment style is formed early in life and thought to be 
relatively stable over time, a focus on a more malleable trait, like the emotion regulation 
strategies associated with insecure attachment styles, may lead to more targeted methods 
for reducing psychological distress in this population. Revealing the types of emotion 
regulation strategies that explain the relationship between attachment style and mental 
health is of particular importance.  
 
Attachment Theory  
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980) is among the most 
influential theories of personality and mental health (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
Although a central tenet of attachment theory is that the quality of close relationships in 
childhood influences psychological wellbeing throughout the lifespan, Bowlby’s own 
work focused on examining the structure and function of attachment style in childhood 
(Bowlby, 1969/1982). However, over the past three decades hundreds of studies have 
investigated the nature and effects of attachment style in adulthood (e.g., Brennan & 
Shaver, 1995; Collins & Read, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2007).   
 
Secure and Insecure Attachment  
Broadly, attachment orientation has been grouped into two major types: secure 
and insecure. Secure attachment is thought to result from sensitive, responsive caregiving 
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and is related to positive psychosocial adjustment and good interpersonal relationships 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Insecure attachment is thought to be the consequence of 
inconsistent and/or unavailable caretaker and is related to relatively ineffective coping 
and interpersonal difficulties (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Brennan et al., 
1998). While variations of insecure attachment styles have been defined in the literature 
over the years (e.g., preoccupied attachment, fearful attachment), recent empirical 
evidence suggest that it may be more accurate to characterize adult attachment in terms of 
the two continuous, orthogonal dimensions of attachment anxiety and attachment 
avoidance (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Fraley & Waller, 1998). Importantly, 
securely attached individuals are low in both of these domains.  
 
Adult Attachment  
Brennan et al. (1998) conceptualized adult attachment anxiety as generally 
resulting from an individual’s underlying belief of being essentially unlovable. They 
posited that adult attachment avoidance, on the other hand, results from an underlying 
belief that others are essentially untrustworthy or malevolent (Brennan et al., 1998). Both 
dimensions of insecure attachment have been shown to be related to negative affect 
(Simpson, 1990); lower levels of emotional adjustment (Lapsley, Rice, & FitzGerald, 
1990; Rice, FitzGerald, Whaley, & Gibbs, 1995; Rice & Whaley, 1994); and 
interpersonal problems (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Horowitz, Rosenberg, & 
Bartholomew, 1993; Mallinckrodt & Wei, 2000). Conversely, securely attached 
individuals have been shown to experience less psychological distress and negative affect 
in general as compared to those with avoidant or anxious attachment styles (for a review, 
see Lopez & Brennan, 2000).  
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Theories of Affect Regulation and Emotion Regulation  
The ways in which insecurely attached adults manage distress was first explored 
within the framework of affect-regulation (Main, 1990; Collins et al., 2006, Mikulincer et 
al., 2003, Cassidy, 1994). Affect-regulation theory is an extension of attachment theory, 
and assumes that secure, avoidant, and attachment anxiety styles are associated with 
unique patterns of affect-regulation that are the result of early experiences in close 
relationships. A central tenet of this theory is that insecurely attached individuals are 
more likely than securely attached individuals to rely on psychological defenses that limit 
coping flexibility and generate interpersonal conflicts (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b).  
Main (1990) posited that there are two types of “secondary attachment strategies” 
that insecurely attached individuals engage in when their internalized attachment systems 
are activated (i.e., their needs are not met and/or they are left feeling vulnerable or 
unsafe). These approaches to managing distress are labeled as hyperactivating strategies 
(i.e., the up-regulating of emotion) and deactivating strategies (i.e., the down-regulating 
of emotion). According to Shaver & Mikulincer (2002), whether an individual develops a 
tendency towards hyperactivating strategies or deactivating strategies is largely 
dependent on whether proximity seeking has historically been successful or not.  
For individuals who experience separation from the attachment figure as aversive, 
despite the unavailability and/or inconsistency of that figure (i.e., attachment anxiety), 
proximity seeking is perceived as a viable option. Thus, the individual engages in 
hyperactivating strategies to upregulate their distress in an attempt to get the attention of 
the caregiver and ideally have their needs met. On the contrary, those who have 
internalized the experience of being neglected or punished for expressing attachment 
needs perceive attachment figures as aversive and/or proximity seeking as futile. They 
adapt to such circumstances by downregulating distress through the use of deactivating 
strategies (Main, 1990).  
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Although the literatures have generally been apart from one another, affect 
regulation theory can reasonably be considered conceptually similar to emotion 
regulation theory (Gross, 1998; 2007). Various emotion regulation strategies can be 
thought of as falling into the broader categories of hyperactivating or deactivating 
strategies. For instance, it’s natural to view suppressive and avoidant approaches to 
emotion regulation (e.g., experiential avoidance) as deactivating strategies because they 
serve to limit the experience and expression of affect. It also makes sense to view 
emotion regulation strategies like rumination, which sustains and intensifies the 
experience of negative emotion, as a hyperactivating strategy.  
According to affect regulation theory, both deactivating and hyperactivating 
strategies to emotion regulation, while adaptive in the short-term, have negative 
psychological consequences. On the contrary, individuals with secure attachment styles 
are thought to rely mostly on adaptive, constructive ways of managing distress. Hazen & 
Shaver (1987) attribute this to internalized positive expectations of others, positive views 
of themselves, and confidence in their ability to tolerate stress and regulate problematic 
emotions. Viewing this concept through the lens of emotion regulation theory, it makes 
sense that securely attached individuals may rely on the use of perspective-taking 
approaches like cognitive reappraisal to regulate their emotions, which is thought to 
result in more wellbeing and less distress (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).  
 
Hyperactivating Strategies: Rumination 
Rumination, which can be thought of as a hyperactivating approach to emotion 
regulation, is described as “a pervasive focus on thoughts and feelings associated with an 
emotion-eliciting event” (Gross, 2010, p.503). Rumination has been shown to be 
associated with attachment anxiety (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), and has been 
established as both a cause and consequence of depression and anxiety (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Further, a systematic review by Malik, Wells, & Wittkowski (2015) 
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found strong evidence in support of hyperactivating strategies as mediators between 
attachment style and depression.  
 
Deactivating Strategies: Experiential Avoidance  
Given that affect-regulation theory associates attachment avoidance with 
deactivating strategies to manage emotions, it can be reasonably assumed that attachment 
avoidance will also be associated with experiential avoidance. Experiential avoidance 
appears to fall under the category of deactivating strategies, as it functions to 
downregulate distressing thoughts and feelings. However, experiential avoidance is 
unique in that it is described as “excessive negative evaluations of unwanted thoughts, 
feelings, and experiences, resulting in an unwillingness to experience these internal 
events” (Hayes et al., 2004). Experiential avoidance has been shown to be associated with 
high levels of psychological distress, is thought to increase feelings of emptiness and 
inauthenticity, and has been shown as related to a general lack of wellbeing (Hayes et al., 
2004).  
 
Perspective-taking Approaches  
Perspective taking approaches, including reappraisal, big picture appraisal, 
cognitive flexibility, and decentering are thought to be helpful, adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies and are generally characterized by an ability to consider multiple 
interpretations of distressing emotions and situations. These constructs have generally 
been shown to be associated with low levels of negative emotional experience and high 
levels of positive emotional experience (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Haner & Rude, 2015; 
Haner, Rude, & Miller, 2015; Fresco et al, 2006; Dennis & Wal, 2010). Because secure 
attachment has been associated with flexibility of cognitive appraisals (Zimmerman, 
1999), it is likely that securely attached individuals are also more apt to develop a 
psychological “platform” for seeking and attaining perspective.  
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Mental Health Variables  
That the dimensions of insecure attachment (i.e., anxiety, avoidance) are related 
to symptoms of psychological distress and diminished wellbeing is well established in the 
literature (see Milkulincer & Shaver, 2007 for a review). For example, studies have 
shown that insecure adult attachment styles are associated with depression, anxiety, and 
hostility (Priel & Shamaiu, 1995; Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993; Robert, Gotlib, & 
Kassel, 1996); negative affect (Simpson, 1990); and lower levels of emotional adjustment 
(Lapsley, Rice, & FitzGerald, 1990; Rice, FitzGerald, Whaley, & Gibbs, 1995; Rice & 
Whatley, 1994). In contrast, multiple studies have shown that securely attached 
individuals experience significantly less psychological and interpersonal stress than those 
with insecure attachment styles (Lopez & Brennan, 2000; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007; 
van Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1996; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991, 
Brennan et al., 1998; Kafetsios and Sideridis, 2006; La Guardia et al., 2000; Lavy and 
Littman-Ovadia, 2011; Wei et al., 2011).  
While psychological distress and wellbeing are sometimes treated as one 
construct (i.e., mental health), it’s important to note that evidence exists in support of 
these constructs being only partially orthogonal (Veit & Ware, 1983). A more accurate 
way of conceptualizing mental health may be to treat psychological distress and 
wellbeing as unique, latent constructs comprised of a number of individual factors, as 
they will be in the present study.   
 
The Current Study 
The aim of this study was to reveal the emotion regulation mechanisms by which 
internalized models of attachment exert their influence on adults’ wellbeing and 
psychological distress. Since psychological distress and wellbeing have been shown as 
somewhat inversely related to one another but still representing distinct constructs, it was 
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expected that attachment styles and emotion regulation variables would be uniquely 
associated with each of these mental health variables. Based on previous research, it was 
expected that attachment anxiety would be related to psychological distress. It was also 
expected that this relationship would be mediated by rumination, which is assumed to be 
conceptually similar to hyperactivating strategies, and inversely mediated by perspective-
taking approaches, which share important elements in common with adaptive affect-
regulation strategies like flexibility of appraisals. It was anticipated that attachment 
avoidance would be inversely related to wellbeing and that this relationship would be 
mediated by experiential avoidance, a strategy thought to function similarly to the 
deactivating approaches of affect regulation, and inversely mediated by perspective-
taking approaches.  
Using survey data from a sample of college undergraduates, structural equation 
modeling techniques (SEM) were used to examine the relationships between attachment 
anxiety/attachment avoidance, the use of particular approaches to emotion regulation 
(perspective taking; rumination; experiential avoidance), and mental health variables.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Attachment Theory   
Attachment Theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980) is among the most 
developed and ubiquitous constructs in psychology, originating over half a century ago 
and continuing to attract the interest of scholars today. Attachment Theory is grounded in 
Bowlby’s (1969/1982) hypothesis that a child’s need for protection and proximity to its 
mother is fundamental for wellbeing and development, such that children whose 
emotional needs are met inconsistently tend to become insecurely attached, experiencing 
high levels of relational stress. Secure attachment results from a sense of confidence in 
the availability of caregivers to protect and provide for the child.  Whether a child 
becomes securely or insecurely attached is thought to be determined during the sensitive 
time period between infancy and adolescence, where caregiver experiences are 
internalized, eventually resulting in a working model of relationships that is thought to 
persist relatively unchanged throughout the life span (Bowlby, 1973).  
According to Bowlby, early attachment experiences have a long-lasting impact on 
later development and functioning. Longitudinal studies generally support this 
hypothesis—in examining the stability of attachment from infancy through young 
adulthood, most research indicates that attachment orientation is at least moderately 
stable (Cozzarelli, Karafa, Collins, & Tagler, 2003; Fraley, 2002). However, some 
research has suggested that attachment style is subject to fluidity in the face of changes in 
wellbeing and coping abilities, such that when individuals engage in healthier coping 
strategies and experience less psychological distress, they are also more secure in their 
attachments (Zhang & Labouvie-Vief, 2004).   
Attachment and adversity.  
Bowlby (1969/1982, 1973, 1980) conceptualized attachment as a “system” that 
functions to protect young, vulnerable children from danger and increase the likelihood 
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of survival. The attachment system is particularly likely to become activated when certain 
dangers or stressors are present, including physical and emotional stressors (i.e., hunger, 
separation). More recent research in adult attachment by Mikulincer and Shaver (2007) 
suggests that the attachment system is activated similarly in adults, but attachment threats 
in adulthood are distinct from those seen in childhood. For example, it has been shown 
that inducing negative affect can activate the attachment system (Piertromanco & Barnett, 
2000) and that merely reminding individuals of their own mortality was enough to 
activate the attachment system (Mikuliner et al., 2000).  
Secure attachment.  
Secure attachment is thought to result from sensitive, attuned caregiving, wherein 
the caregiver appropriately responds to the child’s attachment behaviors (i.e., proximity 
seeking) most of the time. If these conditions are satisfied, the child internalizes a sense 
of the world being safe and others as being reliable and generally benevolent (Weinfield, 
Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson, 1999). Importantly, caregivers who are attuned to a child’s 
needs demonstrate to children that proximity-seeking is a helpful way of regulating 
negative emotions (Waters et al., 1998). In addition to this, securely attached children 
learn to view themselves and others in a positive manner, have a sense of self-worth, and 
view others as capable and supportive (Mikulincer et al., 2003).  Mikulincer and Shaver 
(2007) describe the effects of successful proximity-seeking in the following manner: 
“This cycle – experiencing threats or distress, seeking protection and comfort from an 
attachment figure, experiencing stress reduction and felt security, and returning to other 
interests and activities – provides a prototype of both successful emotion regulation and 
regulation of interpersonal closeness” (p. 14).  
Secure attachment is associated with a number of positive traits. Hazen & Shaver 
(1987) attribute this to internalized positive expectations of others, positive views of 
themselves, and confidence in their ability to tolerate stress and regulate problematic 
emotions. For example, instead of adhering rigidly to certain coping strategies, securely 
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attached individuals demonstrate the ability to see the situation in context and approach it 
with a variety of emotion management strategies that are most suitable to the situation 
(Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007).  
For example, a securely attached individual is mostly able to keep emotional 
reactions at bay when the consequences of display are undesirable (i.e., expressing anger 
towards a teacher after being reprimanded), but is also able to be emotionally open and 
express frustration towards a close friend in an effort towards conflict resolution. These 
healthy ways of managing interpersonal conflict—compromising, integrating the 
perspectives of others with one’s own, support seeking, and being open to discussing and 
resolving conflict— are all general characteristics of securely attached people (Carnelley, 
Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1994; Levy & Davis, 1988; Pistole, 1989; Larose, Bernier, Soucy, 
& Duchesne, 1999; Ognibene & Collins, 1998; Wallace & Vaux, 1993). 
Insecure attachment.  
Research beginning with Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, and Wall (1978) and 
continuing through recent studies by personality and social psychologists (reviewed by 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007a), indicates that insecure attachment in adulthood is 
characterized by the experience of anxiety and/or avoidance in the context of close 
relationships (Bartholowmew & Horowitz, 1991; Brennan et al., 1998).  
Attachment anxiety reflects the degree to which a person worries that an 
attachment figure will not be available or responsive during times of need. This is 
thought to result from an inconsistent caregiver in childhood, creating in the individual in 
an excessive need for reassurance and attention in close relationships. The anxious 
individual may utilize an array of unhelpful hyperactivating affect-regulation strategies 
(i.e., rumination, excessive emotionality) to meet these ends (Main, 1990; Collins et al., 
2006; Mikulincer et al., 2003; Cassidy, 1994). Further, insecure individuals in general are 
more likely than secure individuals to rely on rigid psychological defenses. This tendency 
inherently limits one’s ability to cope flexibly with distress and interpersonal conflicts, 
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adding to the anxious person’s distress and putting strain on close relationships 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b).  
For example, predominantly anxious individuals generally don’t make active 
attempts to manage problematic situations in ways that generate positive side effects: 
Their need for soothing is great, but they have little confidence that their needs will be 
met. In turn, they up regulate their emotions in hopes that someone will notice and meet 
their needs. This paradoxically makes it less likely that an attachment figure will be 
responsive because that individual may become easily overwhelmed by the needs of the 
anxious individual. Thus, out of the attachment orientations, anxious individuals seem to 
experience the highest levels of psychological distress.  
Attachment avoidance, on the other hand, results from a rejecting, punishing, or 
invalidating caregiver, leading the neglected child to become excessively self-reliant 
because he has learned that seeking proximity is futile. Deactivating strategies (e.g., 
suppression) are used to create an emotional distance from others (Shaver & Mikulincer, 
2002). Individuals who are have high levels of attachment avoidance tend to experience 
less frequency and intensity of psychological distress than anxious individuals. However, 
this is at the possible cost of dampening their emotional experiences and forgoing close 
social relationships that increase quality of life and could provide corrective emotional 
experiences (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Their inner experience seems to be  
characterized by a tendency to become psychologically shut down in the face of 
distress and a general mistrust of others. Taken together, these two core characteristics 
lead to an unwillingness to confide in others. However, these individuals generally appear 
calm and collected. This is likely a consequence of being out of touch with their own 
emotions as they have such highly developed mechanisms to keep distressing thoughts 
and feelings at bay. Further, they may be made uncomfortable by others seeking 
psychological intimacy with them and are unlikely to be someone who others confide in.    
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Adult Attachment.  
As opposed to a focus on relationships with parents and early caregivers, adult 
attachment theory focuses on relationships that are prominent in adulthood—particularly 
romantic relationships. It is assumed that attachment style in adulthood will be similar to 
that of childhood, because adults enter relationships with a history of attachment 
experiences and working models of attachment that are thought to be rooted, at least in 
part, in the quality of one’s early attachment experiences. These cognitive-affective 
representations of relationships developed in childhood continue to shape how adults 
think about, feel towards, and behave in their current relationships. Characteristics of 
anxious adults are a tendency to experience emotional extremes, jealously, and conflict; 
avoidant adults report low levels of intimacy and commitment as well as less stable 
relationships; secure adults tend to experience satisfying, well-functioning relationships 
(Feeney, 1999).  
For example, secure adults are comfortable with closeness, feel valued by others 
and worthy of affection, and perceive others as trustworthy and responsive. They report 
high levels of satisfaction with interpersonal relationships and low levels of interpersonal 
distress (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Mikulincer (1997) found that secure attachment in 
adults is associated with the ability to skillfully regulate distressing emotions, which 
theoretically may lend itself to openness to novel information and development of 
adaptive strategies to cope with environmental demands. Additionally, securely attached 
adults have been shown to appraise a wide variety of stressful events in less threatening 
terms than insecure people (e.g. Berant, Mikulincer, & Florian, 2001a, 2001b; Birnbaum, 
Orr, Mikulincer, & Florian, 1997; Mikulincer & Florian, 1995, 1999; Radecki-Bush, 
Farrell, & Bush, 1993). They are also more apt to acknowledge and display a range of 
emotions, which is thought to be a consequence of their ability to access unpleasant 
feelings and memories without being overwhelmed by them (Hesse, 1999). All of these 
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characteristics contribute to high levels of cognitive and emotional openness and the 
ability to readily revise faulty information in the face of new evidence. 
Anxious adults deeply desire closeness but are frequently worried about rejection 
and abandonment. They depend greatly on acceptance by others in order to consider 
themselves worthy, but lack confidence that others value them and will be available in 
times of need. Avoidant adults may desire social contact and keep a number of 
acquaintances with ease, but they are uncomfortable with intimacy because they expect to 
be rejected in times of need and/or perceive people as unreliable and uncaring. While 
avoidant adults may experience less frequent and intense negative feelings than their 
anxious counterparts, the denial of attachment needs and lack of social connectedness is 
thought to diminish wellbeing (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Collins & Read, 1990; 
Fraley, Davis, & Shaver; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer, 1998a; Mikulincer, Orbach, 
& Iavieli, 1998; Simpson, 1990).  
Measuring attachment style.  
Importantly, Bowlby’s original theory has resulted in two unique paradigms—that 
of the developmental psychologists (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978), who 
relied on observation of infant-parent relationships to determine attachment style (AT), 
and that of the social psychologists (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; see Feeney, 1999b, for a 
review) who applied Ainsworth’s (1978) developmental theory to adult romantic 
relationships. Although the former focuses on infancy and the latter on adulthood, they 
share Bowlby’s general conceptualization of secure and insecure attachment styles and 
associated affect regulation strategies. While both lines of thought are relevant to 
discussion in the context of this study, social and personality methods for assessing and 
conceptualization attachment will be emphasized because they pertain specifically to 
adult attachment.  
The question of how to best measure attachment style has been difficult to answer 
definitively, both due to the theoretical split mentioned above and to the difficulty of 
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establishing satisfactory psychometric properties. Within the psychodynamic tradition, 
the measure of choice historically has been the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; 
George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985), a clinical interview focusing on mental representations 
of parent-child relationships. However, the extensive time required for training, 
administration, and interpretation has kept it from being especially practical in large 
research studies.  
In the social psychology tradition, early self-report measures of attachment were 
categorical in nature (i.e., forcing individuals into one of four discrete categories) and 
thus suffered from numerous psychometric limitations (see Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 
1998; Fraley & Waller, 1998; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994, for discussions). Using a 
taxonomic approach, Meehl (1995) and Waller & Meehl (1998) made a strong empirical 
case that adult attachment doesn’t fit a categorical model, and thus attempts to impose 
categorical models on attachment style could lead to serious problems in analysis and 
conceptualization. Rather, a continuous measurement approach that can account for 
variations and nuances in AT is recommended (Fraley & Waller, 1998).  
Social psychology research began to focus on developing measures of AT that 
treated it as a continuous variable—specifically, Brennan et al. (1998) began focusing on 
dimensional models of attachment and on developing a corresponding multi-item, self-
report measure of AT—the Experiences in Close Relationships scales (ECR). The 
measure appeared to have limitations, including a crude scoring method, and in an effort 
towards further precision, Fraley, Waller, and Brennan (2000) used Item Response 
Theory (IRT) to test whether the ECR scales, along with three other measures of AT, 
possessed adequate psychometric properties. Of the four measures investigated, only the 
ECR scales revealed adequate psychometric properties. The ECR scales were then 
refined using IRT to select the most useful items, and as a result, their measurement 
precision was drastically increased (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). Now, the ECR 
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scales are widely accepted as one of the most reliable and valid ways to measure 
attachment when conducting an attachment interview is not an option.   
While many researchers view the AAI as a more sensitive and comprehensive 
measure of attachment style, it is difficult to utilize with larger sample sizes due to the 
amount of time and resources it takes to administer and interpret. In general, the self-
report ECR scales seem to be the next best choice for large empirical studies of adult 
attachment, as they have demonstrated the best reliability and validity of the self-report 
attachment measures. While theory suggests that the two types of measures are tapping 
into the same attachment construct, few studies have investigated whether this is true. 
There is less convergence in research findings on adult romantic relationships from 
studies using the AAI and self-reports than one may expect given the common theoretical 
roots of the two traditions. Thus, future studies are needed to shed light on whether or not 
the two measures tap the same attachment construct and whether the AAI or self-report 
measures are more stable indicators of attachment over time (Jacobvitz, Curran, & 
Moller, 2002).  
Affect Regulation Theory  
The ways in which insecurely attached adults manage distress was initially 
explored within the framework of affect-regulation (Main, 1990; Collins et al., 2006, 
Mikulincer et al., 2003, Cassidy, 1994). Affect-regulation theory is an extension of 
attachment theory, and assumes that secure, avoidant, and anxious attachment styles are 
associated with unique patterns of affect-regulation that are the result of early experiences 
in close relationships. A central tenet of this theory is that insecurely attached individuals 
are more likely than securely attached individuals to rely on psychological defenses that 
limit coping flexibility and generate interpersonal conflicts (Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2007b).  
Main (1990) proposed two types of “secondary attachment strategies” that 
insecurely attached individuals engage in when their internalized attachment systems are 
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activated (i.e., their needs are not met and/or they are left feeling vulnerable or unsafe). 
These approaches to managing distress are referred to as hyperactivating strategies (i.e., 
the up-regulating of emotion) and deactivating strategies (i.e., the down-regulating of 
emotion). According to Shaver & Mikulincer (2002), whether an individual develops a 
tendency towards hyperactivating strategies or deactivating strategies is largely 
dependent on the futility or success of proximity seeking.   
For individuals who experience separation from the attachment figure as aversive, 
despite the unavailability and/or inconsistency of that figure (i.e., attachment anxiety), 
proximity seeking is perceived as a viable option. Thus, the individual engages in 
hyperactivating strategies to upregulate their distress in an attempt to get the attention of 
the caregiver and have their attachment needs met. On the contrary, those who have 
internalized the experience of being neglected or punished for expressing attachment 
needs perceive attachment figures as aversive and/or proximity seeking as futile. They 
adapt to such circumstances by downregulating distress through the use of deactivating 
strategies (Main, 1990).  
Attachment avoidance and deactivating strategies.  
According to Mikulincer & Shaver (2007, p.22) the purpose of deactivating 
strategies is to “avoid frustration and distress caused by attachment figure unavailability” 
and to emphasize one’s lack of need for others and self-reliance (Shaver & Mikulincer, 
2004). Further, individuals who are demonstrate higher levels of attachment avoidance 
and who rely on deactivating strategies are characterized as emotionally inhibited, in that 
they limit their expression of affect, and particularly of negative affect (Magai, 1999; 
Mikulincer, et al., 2003; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Wei, Vogel, et al., 2005).  
Because suppressive and avoidant approaches to regulation emotions are by 
definition deactivating approaches (i.e., they function to limit the experience and 
expression of affect), it is thought emotion regulation strategies like experiential 
avoidance and suppression are associated with attachment avoidance. Generally 
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supporting this idea is work by Shaver & Mikulincer (2002), which posited that avoidant 
individuals’ affect regulation is likely to be characterized by the use of preemptive 
strategies (e.g., purposeful inattention to distress) and response-focused and distancing 
strategies (e.g., suppression of emotion). Empirical evidence also suggests the existence 
of these relationships—Fraley & Shaver (2007) found that avoidant individuals tend to 
not acknowledge the experience of negative emotions.  
Attachment anxiety and hyperactivating strategies.  
Mikulincer and Shaver (2007) suggested that attachment anxiety is associated 
with attempts to sustain and intensify the experience of negative emotions, rather than to 
minimize it. By engaging in hyperactivating strategies like emotional reactivity, anxious 
individuals attempt to receive attention from others by drawing attention to themselves 
(Wei et al., 2005). Further, individuals who demonstrate higher levels of attachment 
anxiety have been consistently found to appraise stressful events as more threatening, to 
have a low stress-resistant attitude and to use emotion-focused coping by directing 
attention toward their own distress (Birnbaum et al., 1997; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; 
Neria et al., 2001), suggesting low utilization of both reappraisal and suppression and 
high utilization of strategies such as rumination (see section on hyperactivating 
strategies: rumination).  
Secure attachment and perspective-taking approaches.  
Securely attached individuals are most likely to use adaptive emotion regulation 
strategies. Theoretically, this is due to emotionally responsive caregiving that is 
characteristic of secure attachment, wherein securely attached individuals internalize 
experiences of their “emotional signals” being noticed and responded to. Mikulincer & 
Shaver (2007) proposed that the emotion regulation strategies used by securely attached 
individuals tend to be antecedent-focused (i.e., modifying a situation as to minimize 
distress rather than attempting to minimize distress caused by the situation). Further, they 
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are thought to be more able than insecure attachment types to tolerate negative emotions 
and are likely to use cognitive reappraisal to regulate their emotions.  
Additionally, Waters (1999) and Zimmerman (1999) posited that secure 
individuals who use adaptive emotion regulation strategies are able to flexibly modify the 
types of emotion regulation strategies used based on the environmental demands of a 
particular situation, and empirical evidence from the same study suggested that secure 
attachment is indeed associated with flexibility of cognitive appraisals. Zimmerman 
(1999) proposed that this may be because securely attached individuals are more easily 
able to access their own behavior and feelings in order to consider them during the 
regulation process. It makes conceptual sense that each of these characteristics might lend 
themselves to the development of a psychological “platform” for seeking and attaining 
perspective. 
Emotion Regulation Theory 
Given that attachment theory has been broadly defined as a theory of how 
individuals develop patterns of affect-regulation (AT) in childhood that persist in some 
form into adulthood, it makes sense conceptually that AT has implications to and 
associations with another theoretical domain, emotion regulation theory (ER). Cassidy 
(1994) conceptually expanded upon this idea, delineating the influence of attachment 
style on individual differences in emotion regulation by building upon the idea that 
generally, securely attached individuals are flexible in their ability to accept, integrate, 
and regulate both positive and negative emotions. Contrarily, insecure individuals are 
thought to rigidly engage in either hypo- or hyper-activating emotion regulation 
strategies. Because attachment style is thought to be relatively stable over time, and 
because insecure attachment styles are particularly problematic when individuals are 
under stress, researchers have begun to establish the mediating role of emotion regulation 
in the relationship between attachment style and negative affect (Wei et al., 2005). For 
the purpose of clarity in the following sections, an important underlying assumption is 
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that particular types of emotion regulation strategies naturally fall in line with the 
hyperactivating and deactivating affect-regulation strategies (i.e., rumination is 
considered a hyperactivating strategy; suppression is considered a deactivating strategy). 
In investigating this relationship, researchers have tended to explore emotion 
regulatory processes as defined by Emotion Regulation Theory (ER; Gross, 1998; 2007). 
According to ER theory, emotions arise in reaction to internal or external stimuli and can 
be positive or negative. While emotions play an important role in influencing behavioral 
responses, decision-making, and memory, they are not always helpful. For example, 
emotions can occur at the wrong time or at the wrong intensity level (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). In response to this, individuals have developed a natural tendency to regulate their 
emotions, or attempt to influence the experience and expression of their emotions (Gross, 
1998; 2007). Importantly, emotion regulation can be done consciously or unconsciously 
and regulatory strategies may be automatic or controlled. Much like attachment style, 
emotion regulation has become clinically relevant due to its relationship with general 
psychological distress, as well as its proven explanatory role in over half the DSM-IV 
Axis I diagnoses and all Axis II diagnoses (Gross & Levenson, 1997). 
The modal model of emotion.  
According to Gross & Thompson (2007), three core features of emotion make up 
the modal model of emotion: “a person-situation transaction that compels attention, has 
particular meaning to an individual, and gives rise to a coordinated yet flexible multi-
system response to the ongoing person-situation transaction.” This situation-attention-
appraisal response sequence begins with an internal or external situation that is 
psychologically relevant. Regardless of the nature of the situation, it is attended to in 
various ways that give rise to appraisals that inform the individual’s assessment of the 
situation’s familiarity, valence, and value relevance (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Most 
emotion theorists agree that it is these appraisals in particular that give rise to emotional 
responses.  
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Core features of emotion regulation.  
Individuals regulate both positive and negative emotions internally and externally. 
Emotion regulation occurs at five points: situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). What makes each of these families unique is the point at which they occur in the 
emotion-generative process: the first four are antecedent focused, in that they occur 
before appraisals give rise to full blown emotional response. The fifth occurs after the 
emotional response has been triggered.  
Situation selection. This is the most forward looking approach to emotion 
regulation in that it involves taking actions that will make it more or less likely that we 
end up in situations that we expect will bring about desirable or undesirable emotions. 
The biggest issue with this approach is that people often profoundly over- or under-
estimate the extent to which a situation will provoke an emotional response (e.g., 
overestimating the duration of negative emotions). Another relevant drawback to this 
approach is that individuals often focus on short-term benefits instead of long-term costs 
(e.g., a shy person avoids a social situation and feels better in the short-term, but the long-
term cost of this is this is social isolation).  
Situation modification. Individuals can make efforts to directly modify a 
situation so as to alter its emotional impact. Essentially, situations that can potentially 
induce an emotional response do not always have to elicit an emotional response, at least 
not to the caliber we anticipate. Parents often modify situations for their children in order 
to reduce the likelihood of distressing emotions (e.g., helping with a frustrating game) as 
well as to increase experiences of positive emotion (e.g., planning an elaborate birthday 
party). In adults, situation modification is often in the form of assisting in problem 
solving or confirming the legitimacy of an emotional response in another. At its core, 
situation modification involves the modification of external, physical environments and 
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efforts at modifying internal environments in order to produce cognitive change (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007).  
Attentional deployment. It is very possible to regulate emotions without actually 
altering the physical environment. Attentional deployment has to do with how individuals 
direct their attention within a situation in order to influence their emotions. This is 
considered an internal version of situation modification and is used from infancy to 
adulthood, particularly when situation selection and situation modification are not 
possible. Attentional deployment comes in various forms, one being distraction, wherein 
an individual focuses their attention of different aspects of the situation or directs 
attention away from the situation altogether. It can also involve changing internal focus 
by calling forth thoughts or memories that are inconsistent with the undesired emotional 
state. Concentration is somewhat the inverse of distraction, in that it draws attention to 
emotional features of a situation. A well-known maladaptive form of attentional 
deployment is rumination, which involves repetitive focus on feelings associated with 
stressful events and a negative evaluation of their consequences (Bushman, 2002; 
Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). Not surprisingly, rumination has a strong 
relationship with depression (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Werner & Gross, 2010).  
Cognitive change. Even though cognitive change is late in the emotion-
generative process, a particular emotional response is by no means set in stone. Cognitive 
change refers to altering our appraisal of the situation in order to alter its emotional 
significance. Cognitive change includes changing the way we think about the situation or 
changing the way we think about our capacity to manage the demands it poses. One form 
of cognitive change that has recently gained momentum is reappraisal, the veil of 
emotion regulation that big picture appraisal falls under. Reappraisal involves internally 
changing the meaning of a situation so that it alters its emotional impact. Gross & James 
(2007) posit that over time, reappraisal plays an important role in shaping how an 
individual views the self, others, and the environment.  
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Response modulation. As previously mentioned, response modulation occurs 
after an emotional response has been initiated. It thereby refers to an individual’s ability 
to influence the physiological, experiential, or behavioral responding as directly as 
possible (e.g., drugs, exercise, relaxation, alcohol, cigarettes, food). Another form of 
response modulation is expressive suppression, wherein an individual alters his or her 
external display of emotion, often hiding true feelings from others. It is important to 
consider the context of response modulation—some ways of regulating ones emotions 
after the emotion has occurred may appear maladaptive, but upon consideration of the 
circumstances it may come clear that a “maladaptive” response was actually the only 
adaptive response to the particular situation (e.g., coping with an emotionally abusive 
family). Furthermore, it is important to consider cultural values in determining what 
constitutes an adaptive or maladaptive response (e.g., expressing negative emotion may 
be viewed by Americans as appropriately assertive, but by Nepalese adults as very 
inappropriate) (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
Measuring emotion regulation.  
Because surveying all of the many emotion regulation strategies at once isn’t 
feasible, the focus of most studies has been narrowed to strategies that fall under the veil 
of suppression and reappraisal, described by Gross & John (2003) as commonly used ER 
strategies that are strongly linked to individual differences. Gross & John (2003) 
developed a 10-item self-report measure of reappraisal and suppression, the ERQ 
(Emotion Regulation Questionnaire). For each item, the researchers designated whether it 
intended to measure suppression or reappraisal—for example, “I control my emotions by 
changing the way I think about the situation I’m in” targets the use of reappraisal, and “I 
control my emotions by not expressing them” describes suppression. Based on the 
number of suppression and reappraisal items endorsed, individuals are classified as being 
mostly “suppressors” or mostly “reappraisers.”  
Suppression.  
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Suppression, or the tempering or containing of natural emotional reactions, occurs 
after an emotional response has been initiated and refers to an individual’s ability to 
influence the physiological, experiential, or behavioral responding as directly as possible 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007). Since suppression comes so late in the emotion generative 
process, it primarily modifies the behavioral aspect of emotion response tendencies, 
specifically referred to as expressive suppression. While efforts to conceal emotional 
reactions to others via expressive suppression may be successful, frequent use of this ER 
strategy can have the unintended consequence of dampening the expression of positive 
emotion as well (Gross & John, 2003). Most importantly, suppression is only helpful in 
reducing the expression of negative emotion, not the internal experience of negative 
emotion itself—which could potentially contribute to an accumulation of unresolved 
negative emotions. Other consequences of frequent use of suppression include the 
depletion of cognitive resources due to the effortful management of emotion response 
tendencies as they arise (Gross & John, 2003) and a sense of incongruence between inner 
experience and outer expression that may lead to feelings of inauthenticity and alienation 
(Rogers, 1951; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Illardi, 1997).  
Although frequent, pervasive use of suppression as a means to regulate emotions 
has been linked to low levels of psychological wellbeing in the general population (Gross 
& Levenson, 1997), it’s important to note that depending on the context in which it is 
deployed, suppression can be an adaptive or maladaptive emotion regulation strategy. For 
example, the ability to suppress an emotional response is often necessary in order to 
maintain social appropriateness (e.g., an employee suppressing anger towards boss while 
a customer is present), but when used pervasively and across contexts (e.g., the employee 
continues to suppress the anger even when no longer in the room with the customer) it 
can become problematic. Given the importance of context in emotion suppression, it 
becomes important to investigate the nuances of this phenomenon.  
Reappraisal.  
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Reappraisal is defined as a form of cognitive change that involves construing a 
potentially emotion-eliciting situation in such a way that it changes its emotional 
influence (Gross & John, 2003; Werner & Gross, 2010).For example, during a job 
interview, one might view the experience as an opportunity to find out whether the job is 
a good fit, rather than as a test of one’s worth. Reappraisal of stressors is widely 
considered an adaptive emotion regulation strategy because it does not demand a high 
level of cognitive resources and because it can alter emotion-generative processes at an 
early stage of processing.   
Gross & John (2003) conducted a series of studies that investigated the benefits of 
reappraisal in contrast to the use of suppression. The research revealed that in general, 
reappraisal is a more helpful ER strategy than suppression when used habitually. For 
example, reappraisers tend to negotiate stressful situations by taking an optimistic attitude 
and making efforts to reinterpret information they find distressing, while suppressors 
handle negatie affect by masking their feelings and being careful not to outwardly display 
emotion. Reappraisers also reported experiencing and displaying more positive emotions 
than suppressors, but at the same time are willing to share both positive and negative 
emotions with others, resulting in a better quality of relationships overall. Suppressors 
view their emotions in a less favorable light than reappraisers and therefore are less apt to 
be open about them. Suppressors also tend to have less positive emotional experiences 
and more problematic feelings of inauthenticity, while reappraisers have higher levels of 
self-esteem, wellbeing, and life-satisfaction than suppressors.    
Perspective Taking Approaches 
Big picture appraisal.  
Research thus far has shown that reappraising stressors can be helpful, but 
understanding types of reappraisals that are helpful is still being explored. Scholars have 
recently focused on one promising type of reappraisal, big picture appraisal, which 
consists of “broadening one’s perspective on distressing events and emotions by flexibly 
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considering various contexts of a distressing situation in order to reveal additional 
meanings, attributions, and implications of the event” (Miller, Haner, Rude, 2015). For 
current conceptual purposes, we tentatively suggest three dimensions of big picture 
appraisal that are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive: (1) an extended time 
perspective; (2) the broader context of one’s life goals; and (3) the broader human 
context.  While conceptually these dimensions are distinct, research has not confirmed 
the existence of separate domains of big picture appraisal. 
The first dimension is consideration of how the event and/or one’s reactions to it 
fit into an extended time perspective. This perspective entails an awareness of the 
transience of emotional states, the fact that adverse situations are inevitable, and that 
distress has a natural ebb and flow (Miller, Rude, & Haner, 2015). We hypothesize that 
maintaining an awareness of the effects of time on emotional states may contribute to 
emotional health by allowing individuals to be less distressed by states of emotional pain.    
A second dimension of big picture thinking is consideration of how setbacks or 
adverse experiences fit into the broader context of personal life goals (Miller, Rude, and 
Haner, 2015). What time tends to teach people is that unwanted events often do not 
thwart their most important life pursuits, or at least not to the extent initially thought. 
Alternative ways of realizing these higher level goals often become apparent, or 
sometimes new, equally valued personal life goals emerge. Furthermore, it is not 
infrequent that unwanted events bring about unexpected benefits, including growth and 
learning. 
Finally, a third dimension of big picture thinking mentioned by Miller and Rude 
(2015) is consideration of how one’s experience fits into a broader human context in 
which fundamental similarities across all people’s goals and experiences are apparent.  
One benefit of such a perspective seems to be that it helps individuals avoid taking things 
too “personally,” de-emphasizing their views of such events as “about” them or as 
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reflecting important information about them, in favor of seeing the event or reactions to 
the event as something that links or connects them to others.  
Overall, perspective-taking approaches require a degree of psychological 
flexibility and ability to see things beyond oneself and one’s immediate needs and 
reactions (e.g., decentering). Perspective-taking approaches may also involve the ability 
to see difficult situations as within one’s control and to generate multiple alternative 
solutions to difficult situations (e.g., cognitive flexibility.  
Linking big picture appraisal to outcomes. Supporting the concept and 
usefulness of big picture appraisal, Rude, Mazzetti, Pal, and Stauble (2011) found that 
college students who reported a recent interpersonal rejection experienced lower levels of 
rumination after receiving an experimental big picture intervention. Participants in the 
intervention condition were asked to write in response to probe questions that encouraged 
considering how they would feel about the experience in one to two years, how their 
responses were similar to those of other people, and how a neutral observer might view 
the situation, as compared to either of two control interventions who were asked to write 
about the reasons for the events and their reactions to it or not write about their 
experience at all. Baum and Rude (2013) showed that those writing about adverse 
personal events with attention to the universality and normality of adversity and distress 
experienced lower depression symptoms than a control group at a one- and six-month 
follow-up assessments, although this benefit was limited to participants without elevated 
depression at the beginning of the study. Further, Miller, Rude, and Haner (2015) used an 
implicit induction of big picture thinking (participants read multiple vignettes concluding 
with a big picture interpretation without being encouraged explicitly to think differently) 
and found that big picture thinking increased and generalized to new situations and 
decreased emotional reactivity after a failure experience. 
Several other researchers have shown the benefits of taking a broadened 
perspective, including Kross and Ayduk (e.g. Kross and Ayduk, 2011, 2008; Ayduk and 
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Kross 2010) who showed that participants instructed to take a self-distanced perspective 
on a distressing event (e.g., “…take a few steps back and move away from your 
experience… watch the experience unfold as if it were happening all over again to the 
distant you..” Kross and Ayduk 2008, p.926) experienced less rumination, less distress, 
and lower physiological reactivity than individuals who took a self-immersed perspective 
(e.g. “… relive the situation as if it were happening to you all over again” Kross and 
Ayduk, 2008) or adopted a distraction strategy. Further, Schartau et al. (2009) proposed 
the importance of perspective broadening, wherein individuals are encouraged to broaden 
their perspective by practicing remembering that time heals, finding a silver lining, and 
accepting that bad things happen. In a series of studies, Schartau et al. (2009) showed that 
individuals encouraged to broaden their perspective in this way showed lower levels of 
self-reported negative emotion and electrodermal responses after watching a series of 
distressing films than control participants.   
Measuring big picture appraisal. In an effort towards the creation of sound 
measurement of big picture appraisal, three studies by Haner and Rude (2015) established 
the psychometric properties of a processing measure, the Scrambled Sentences Test for 
Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA). Study 1 established the content validity of the SST–
BPA by showing that judges rated SST–BPA items as consistent with a description of the 
construct. In Studies 2 and 3, participants completed paper and computer-administered 
versions (respectively) of the SST–BPA along with self-report measures of similar and 
dissimilar constructs. Item-total correlations supported internal consistency and 
correlations with other measures supported convergent and discriminant validity of the 
SST-BPA, with correlations between measures of constructs thought to be similar (self-
compassion, reappraisal, openness to experience) in the moderate to high range and 
correlations between dissimilar measures generally low to nonexistent (social desirability, 
suppression, negative affect).  
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In further effort to support and establish BPA as an emotion regulatory strategy, a 
self-report measure of BPA, the Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire (BPAQ), was 
simultaneously developed by Gill, Rude, Miller, & Haner (under review). An initial pool 
of items was created using theory, an informal focus group, a pilot study, and interviews. 
Reliability and validity were established across two studies: Internal consistency was 
found to be high (Cronbach’s alpha = .91) and correlations with measures of similar and 
dissimilar constructs were generally supportive of convergent-discriminant validity. 
Correlations between the BPAQ and three inventories judged to measure similar 
constructs (self-compassion, reappraisal, openness to experience) in the moderate to high 
range, but none were so high as to cast doubt that the BPAQ measures a unique construct. 
Further, correlations with social desirability, rumination, suppression, and negative affect 
were weak, and correlations with measures of neuroticism and positive affect were 
slightly stronger but still in the low range. Investigation of the factor structure of the 
BPAQ is ongoing, and it remains unclear whether the proposed items measure a one-
dimensional construct (i.e., big picture appraisal), or several distinct dimensions of big 
picture appraisal (i.e., transience of time, broader life context, common humanity, etc.). 
This investigation is in process and is important to establishing the construct of big 
picture appraisal.   
Deactivating Strategies: Experiential Avoidance  
When proximity seeking is appraised as a nonviable option for regulating 
distressing emotions, active attempts to handle the distress alone occur. These secondary 
strategies of affect regulation are called deactivating strategies (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988). 
The primary goal of these strategies is to avoid further distress and frustration caused by 
attachment-figure unavailability, which can ultimately lead to the denial of relational 
needs in general. This may include a focus on remaining cognitively and emotionally 
distant from others, and over time, this tendency tends to broaden to distancing oneself 
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from distress in general, whether it is attachment related or not (Mikulincer, Shaver, & 
Pereg, 2003).  
One strategy for regulating emotions that appears similar to deactivating strategies 
(e.g., suppression, repression, failure to acknowledge negative emotions) is experiential 
avoidance (Hayes et al., 1996; 2004). Closely related to suppression but encompassing a 
broader spectrum of avoidance, experiential avoidance (EA) is unique in that it involves 
excessive negative evaluations of unwanted thoughts, feelings, and experiences, resulting 
in an unwillingness to experience these internal events and a deliberate effort to control 
or escape them, even when doing so causes harm in the long run (Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 1999). Although the avoidance of distressing emotions in the short term can be 
beneficial, it can have negative psychological consequences when applied rigidly and 
inflexibly for a long period of time (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). 
Not only are cognitive resources expended on struggling to keep unwanted private 
experiences at bay, leading to decreased functioning, but this type of avoidance has also 
been shown to contribute significantly to psychological distress. Efforts to escape or 
avoid these private psychological experiences are often futile or interfere with valued 
actions (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). 
Hayes et al. (2004) defined experiential avoidance as an unwillingness to 
experience painful emotions, thoughts, and memories, resulting in the temporary 
reduction of negative affect via a variety of avoidance behaviors (e.g., substance abuse, 
self-injury, deliberate thought suppression). ACT researchers grounded their theory in 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), beginning with 
the fundamental idea that the bidirectionality of human language greatly expands the 
range of situations that are aversive because symbolic behavior permits the categorization 
of private events and contact with them in almost any setting, For example, people are 
taught to categorize a loose set of situational cues, bodily sensations, behavioral 
predispositions, and so on as “anxiety” and to evaluate it as “bad.” This “emotion” can 
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then be recalled or predicted via language (e.g., “I felt anxious at school last week” or “I 
am afraid I will get anxious when I get on the plane”).  
Thus, ACT researchers suggested that psychological pain cannot be avoided 
purely by avoiding external situations because aversive states of this kind can be brought 
into a situation via language itself. Therefore individuals focus avoidance on negatively 
evaluated private experiences, and thoughts that are linked to aversive emotions can be 
actively avoided or suppressed (Hayes et al., 2004). Thought suppression and other types 
of avoidance may produce immediate positive effects and thus make EA appear to be an 
attractive and useful emotion regulation strategy. However, this excessive cognitive 
entanglement (particularly with negative self-referential evaluations and excessively 
negative evaluations of private experiences) leads to many unproductive attempts to 
regulate private experiences and results in the inability to take needed action in the face 
of private events. For example, the immediate effect of cognitive distraction is a 
reduction of the avoided thought, but it is only over time that the avoided thought 
increases in frequency (Gold & Wegner, 1995). Researchers hypothesize that this pattern 
of short term reduction of averse emotions actually leads to a long term increase, which 
in turn establishes a self-amplifying loop that might be fairly resistant to change (Hayes 
et al., 2004). 
Importantly, this conceptualization of EA is distinguishable from the related 
construct of neuroticism or negative emotionality. Instead of thinking of EA as an 
individual’s actual or perceived negative affect (what someone is feeling), it can be 
thought of as an individual’s relationship with negative affect (how someone responds to 
what they are feeling). For example, changes in EA could presumably lead to improved 
functioning even in the continued presence of negative emotions (Hayes et al., 1999). 
Despite this conceptual distinction between neuroticism and EA, some researchers still 
question whether the actual experience of negative affect and corresponding emotion 
regulation strategies can be reliably distinguished (Zinbarg & Mineka, 2007). 
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Distinguishing EA and neuroticism can also pose a problem because neuroticism is such 
a pervasive factor associated with multiple forms of psychopathology (Khan, Jacobson, 
Gardner, Prescott, & Kendler, 2005; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Watson, Clark, & 
Harkness, 1994) just as EA has proven to be. In order for the concept of EA to be of 
clinical importance, researchers must distinguish EA from neuroticism by showing that 
EA exhibits incremental predictive power not solely attributable to neuroticism 
(Chmielweski et al., 2011).  
Measuring experiential avoidance. Multiple self-report inventories developed to 
measure EA have been developed over the past decade and are currently in use. In order 
to empirically investigate the construct, Hayes and colleagues (2004) developed the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ) and subsequently, the revised and more 
psychometrically sound AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011). The revised AAQ-II assesses the 
construct referred to as, variously, acceptance, experiential avoidance, and psychological 
inflexibility and scores have consistently predicted a range of outcomes, including mental 
health to work absence rates, that are consistent with underlying theory. Examples of 
items include “I’m afraid of my feelings”, “My painful experiences and memories make 
it difficult for me to live a life that I would value,” and “It’s OK if I remember something 
unpleasant” (reverse coded). In general, the AAQ-II seems to measure internal attitudes 
towards emotional experiences that contribute to avoidance, but does not assess for the 
extent to which individuals avoid their emotions either cognitively or behaviorally.  
Because of the brevity and narrow focus of the AAQ-II, as well as issues around 
poor discriminant validity with neuroticism, a separate group of researchers developed 
The Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ; Chmielewski et 
al., 2011), designed to be a comprehensive, psychometrically sound measure of 
experiential avoidance that provides adequate coverage for the different manifestations of 
EA. Importantly, the MEAQ taps into behaviors, thoughts, and emotions, based on the 
thinking that different domains of avoidance are differently related to psychopathology. 
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Items load on particular subscales that include behavioral avoidance (e.g., “I won’t do 
something if I think it will make me uncomfortable”), distress aversion (e.g.,” If I could 
magically remove all of my painful memories I would), repression/denial (e.g., “I 
sometimes have difficulties identifying how I feel), distraction/suppression (e.g., “When 
something upsetting comes up, I try very hard to stop thinking about it”), procrastination 
(e.g., “I tend to put off unpleasant things that need to be done”), and distress endurance 
(e.g., “People should face their fears”). 
Hyperactivating Strategies: Rumination  
Hyperactivating strategies to manage emotions are thought to occur due to an 
inconsistent and/or unreliable attachment figure in childhood. Because the attachment 
figure is sometimes available, proximity seeking still appears to be a viable option. Thus, 
in the face of uncertainty whether attachment needs will be met, the individual up-
regulates distressing emotions and displays of distress in order to attain proximity, 
security, and love (Cassidy & Kobak, 1998; Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003). 
Generally, hyperactivating strategies include clinging and controlling responses in the 
context of close relationships, as well as cognitive and behavioral efforts aimed at 
maximizing closeness to them (Shaver & Hazan, 1993). According to Shaver & 
Mikulincer (2002), hyperactivating strategies entail the close monitoring of threats to the 
self and attachment-figure unavailability. Consequently, social and emotional threats, as 
well as the potential negative causes of these threats, are exaggerated and the negative 
emotional responses to the threats are intensified (Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003).  
People who primarily utilize hyperactivating strategies tend to react to stressful 
events with intense psychological distress and to ruminate on threat-related worries (see 
Mikulincer & Florian, 1998, for a review). Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) defined rumination 
as focusing passively and repetitively on one’s symptoms of distress (e.g., “life is such a 
struggle,” “I’m so tired and unmotivated”) and on the meanings of those symptoms 
(“Why am I so depressed,” “I’m going to lose everything if I don’t get it together”). 
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While individuals who ruminate are conceptualized as paying too much attention to their 
negative moods, they also don’t tend to take action to correct the issues that they 
ruminate over (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Linking Attachment Style to Mental Health 
 That the dimensions of insecure attachment (i.e., anxiety, avoidance) are related 
to symptoms of psychological distress and diminished wellbeing is well established in the 
literature (see Milkulincer & Shaver, 2007 for a review). For example, studies have 
shown that insecure adult attachment is associated with depression, anxiety, and hostility 
(Priel & Shamaiu, 1995; Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993; Robert, Gotlib, & Kassel, 
1996); negative affect (Simpson, 1990); and lower levels of emotional adjustment 
(Lapsley, Rice, & FitzGerald, 1990; Rice, FitzGerald, Whaley, & Gibbs, 1995; Rice & 
Whatley, 1994). In contrast, many studies have shown that securely attached individuals 
experience significantly less psychological and interpersonal distress than those with 
insecure attachment styles (Lopez & Brennan, 2000; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007; van 
Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1996; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991, Brennan 
et al., 1998; Kafetsios and Sideridis, 2006; La Guardia et al., 2000; Lavy and Littman-
Ovadia, 2011; Wei et al., 2011). 
It has also been shown that the quality of attachment influences the degree of 
psychosocial impairment and symptom severity that individuals experience. Evidence for 
this relationship comes from a study by Eng et al. (2001) that investigated the 
associations between attachment style, social anxiety, and psychosocial functioning. The 
researchers found that individuals with social anxiety who were classified as anxiously 
attached showed greater symptom severity, more depression, and functional impairment 
than those with social anxiety who were classified as securely attached.  
Depression.  
The link between insecure attachment and depression in adulthood has been 
established, with anxiously attached individuals suffering from the condition at a higher 
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rate than those who are predominantly avoidant in their attachments or securely attached 
(Lopez et al., 2001). This makes sense in the context of models of depression 
vulnerability, which posit that negative early experiences, such as exposure to childhood 
abuse or neglect, increase vulnerability to depression later in life. Although many 
individuals with a history of adverse childhood experiences do not go on to develop 
depression, research has shown that these experiences do indeed lead to increased 
vulnerability to depression (Wells et al., 2014). Further, the research on cognitive 
vulnerability to depression shows that insecure attachment types are related to lower self-
esteem and greater dysfunctional attitudes (Gamble & Roberts, 2005; Srivastava & Beer, 
2005), and that these factors in turn are associated with depressive symptomology.  
In support of the idea that insecure attachment contributes to psychopathology, 
longitudinal study by Safford et al. (2004) found that both the anxious and avoidant 
dimensions of insecure attachment were associated with increases in depressive 
symptomology over time, when controlling for initial levels of symptomology. This 
finding in particular—that both dimensions of insecure attachment were associated with 
depression—is in contrast to previous findings that suggested only attachment anxiety 
contributes to depression (e.g., Bifulco et al., 2002; Priel & Shamai, 1995). These 
inconsistent findings suggest that additional research on the issue is needed.  
Anxiety.  
As opposed to the ambiguous relationship between attachment avoidance and 
depression, research suggests that both dimensions of insecure attachment are related to 
anxiety—particularly to cognitive vulnerabilities to anxiety. One of these vulnerabilities 
is the looming maladaptive schema (Williams & Riskind, 2004). This schema is 
conceptualized as a “danger” schema that makes it more likely for individuals to interpret 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening or dangerous (Riskind & Williams, 2006). This 
particular cognitive style broadly influences worry and avoidance, as well as other 
compensatory behaviors (Riskind, Williams, & Joiner, 2006).  
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Linking Attachment Style to Emotion Regulation 
Importantly, it is hypothesized that rather than attachment style having a direct 
effect on mental health, it influences mental health due to its influence on emotion 
regulation, cognition, and various other mechanisms (Wei et al., 2011). While securely 
attached individuals tend to manage stress and negative affect by acknowledging it, 
expressing it, and coping with it (Mikulincer & Florian, 1998), people who have high 
levels of attachment anxiety may manage stress by exaggerating the level of threat it 
poses, reacting to it with strong emotional responses (Lopez, Mauricio, Formley, Simko, 
& Berger, 2001), and excessively requiring the reassurance of others.’ On the other hand, 
individuals who demonstrate attachment avoidance may attempt to manage negative 
affect by inhibiting the display of emotions, denying their experience of negative affect, 
and protecting themselves against potential rejection by others. In general, insecurely 
attached adults rely on emotion-regulation mechanisms that are often ineffective and 
paradoxically increase psychological distress (Kobak & Sceery, 1988; Lopez et al., 2001; 
Mallinckrodt, 2001; Mikulincer & Florian, 1998).  See the above sections Affect 
Regulation and Emotion Regulation for a review. 
Linking Emotion Regulation to Mental Health 
The link between habitual use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and 
mental health has garnered an extensive amount of attention. Emotion regulation has 
become relevant due to its relationship with general psychological distress, as well as its 
proven explanatory role in over half the DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses and all Axis II 
diagnoses (Gross & Levenson, 1997). In an effort to address vulnerabilities to depression, 
anxiety, and other forms of distress, it is important to consider the types of emotion 
regulation that may prove beneficial and/or detrimental to mental health.   
 Experiential avoidance and mental health.  
Research has revealed that experiential avoidance is positively associated 
psychological distress in general (Hayes et al., 2004). This is likely because private, 
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internal events are often unresponsive or even paradoxically increased by deliberate 
control efforts. Further, sometimes difficult emotions are experientially important and 
healthy behavioral changes often initially produce psychological discomfort (Hayes et al., 
1996). More specifically, EA has been shown to be associated with higher levels of 
psychopathology across the board and may be a common factor that underlies a wide 
range of seemingly diverse types of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2004; Chawla & 
Ostafin, 2007; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Folette, & Stosahl, 1996). The relationship 
between experiential avoidance and wellbeing has also been established. Experiential 
avoidance has been thought to increase feelings of emptiness and inauthenticity and 
decrease feelings of life satisfaction and connectedness, and it has been shown as related 
to a lower quality of life (Hayes et al., 2004).  
To understand the importance of EA in relation to various forms of 
psychopathology, it must first be noted that the broad conceptualization of EA 
emphasizes the importance of function over form. That is, although many maladaptive 
behaviors may seem different topographically, when examined contextually, they can be 
recognized as serving the same function—the avoidance of distress (Barlow, Allen, & 
Choate, 2004; Hayes et al., 1996). This results in coverage of a great number of diverse 
behaviors associated with psychiatric disorders—like avoiding places, conversations, or 
thoughts that remind someone of a traumatic event, drinking alcohol to avoid unpleasant 
memories or emotions, or parasuicidal behavior to reduce high emotional arousal 
(Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011). Furthermore, EA is particularly 
strongly correlated with depression, stress, anxiety, and general psychological distress 
(Boulanger, Hayes, & Pistorello, 2010).  
Experiential avoidance also has implications for nonclinical populations as it has 
shown to be related to less frequent positive events and diminished positive affect, life 
satisfaction, and meaning in life as well as a sense of inauthenticity or disconnection from 
self (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006). Studies also show a correlation between 
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EA and an increase in anxiety symptomology in healthy, non-disordered individuals, 
suggesting that experiential avoidance is a psychological vulnerability for, not merely a 
correlate or consequence of, psychopathology (Boulanger, Hayes, & Pistorello, 2010).  
Hyperactivating approaches and mental health.  
Within the emotion regulation literature, rumination has been described as “a 
pervasive focus on thoughts and feelings associated with an emotion-eliciting event” 
(Gross, 2010, p.503). Rumination has been well established as both a cause and 
consequence of depression and anxiety, as evidenced by numerous studies. Rumination 
has been shown to prospectively predict depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic 
& Alloy 2001) and to be related to the development of anxiety and depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). Multiple studies have found that rumination is also linked to longer 
and more severe depression, delayed recovery from depression, and increases in suicidal 
ideation (see Lyubomirsky et al., 2003 for a review). Further evidence comes from 
Conway et al. (2000), which showed that rumination on sadness in particular was 
correlated with depression and predicted levels of negative affect after a sad mood 
induction. Lastly, rumination was shown to moderate the relationship of cognitive 
vulnerability to depression and onset, number, and duration of depressive episodes 
(Robinson & Alloy, 2003).  
Perspective-taking approaches and mental health.  
While perspective-taking approaches to emotion regulation is a relatively new 
area of study, preliminary evidence suggests that these strategies are positively associated 
with mental health. Gross & John (2003) showed that reappraisal is a more helpful 
emotion regulation strategy than suppression when used habitually, and reappraisal has 
been shown to lead to decreased levels of negative emotional experience and increased 
positive emotional experience (Gross & Thompson, 2007 (see section on reappraisal for 
a review). 
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Another hypothesized facet of perspective-taking approaches, big picture 
appraisal, has also been shown as inversely associated with negative affect and 
neuroticism, as well as positively associated with positive affect (Haner & Rude, 2015; 
Rude, Miller, & Haner, 2015). Experimental evidence comes from Baum and Rude 
(2013), which showed that those writing about adverse experiences with attention to the 
universality and normality of adversity of distress experiences lower depression 
symptoms than a control group at one- and six-month follow-up assessments, although 
this benefit was limited to participants without elevated depression at the beginning of the 
study. Experimental evidence also comes from Miller, Rude, & Haner (2015), where an 
implicit induction of big picture thinking was used (participants read multiple vignettes 
concluding with a big picture interpretation without being encouraged explicitly to think 
differently) and it was found that big picture thinking increased and generalized to new 
situations and decreased emotional reactivity after a failure experience. Several other 
researchers have shown the benefits of taking a broadened perspective, including 
experiencing less distress and lower levels of self-reported negative emotion (see section 
on linking big picture appraisal to outcomes for a review).  
Conceptually, it is thought that cognitive flexibility is a necessary component of 
perspective-taking approaches. Cognitive flexibility has been shown as inversely related 
to depression (Dennis & Wal, 2010), and this finding is rooted in theory that rigid 
cognitive styles may characteristic of depression may reinforce the depressed state by 
creating a bias toward the automatic acceptable of maladaptive believes (Moore 1996; 
Teasdale et al., 1995). Further, a study by Palm & Follette (2010) showed that cognitive 
flexibility was inversely associated with post-traumatic stress symptomology. Less is 
known about decentering and mental health, but a recent empirical validation of the 
Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2006) found that the decentering subscale of the 
EQ was inversely related to depressive symptomology. 
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The Potential Mediating Role of Emotion Regulation in the Relationship Between 
Attachment and Mental Health 
In general, theoretical and empirical work suggest that attachment does not 
directly exert its influence upon mental health, but rather that it influences mental health 
due to its influence on cognitive, behavioral, and affective mechanisms (Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007; Eng, Heimberg, Hart, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2001; Hankin, Kassel, & 
Abela, 2005; Ingram, 2003; Murphy & Bates, 1997; Roberts, Gotlib, & Kassel, 1996; 
Safford, et al., 2004; Williams & Riskind, 2004). Evidence pertaining to emotion 
regulation in particular as a mediating variable in the relationship between attachment 
style and mental health is still emerging.  
Wei, Vogel, et al. (2005) conducted what is believed to be the first study aimed at 
examining the specific hypotheses that 1) the association between attachment anxiety and 
negative affect is mediated by hyperactivating strategies and 2) the association between 
attachment avoidance and negative affect is mediated by deactivating strategies. They 
found that the relationship between attachment avoidance and negative affect (i.e., 
depression and anxiety) was mediated by deactivating strategies, and that the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and negative affect (i.e., anxiety and depression) was 
mediated by hyperactivating strategies. A more recent systematic review of emotion 
regulation as a mediator between attachment and depression by Malik, Wells, & 
Wittkowski (2015) did not consistently find suppression (a deactivating strategy) as a 
mediator of the relationship between attachment avoidance and distress, but the review 
did find strong evidence in support of hyperactivating strategies as a mediating variable 
between attachment style and depression. Other studies have also been subject to 
unexpected findings; for instance, a study by Karreman and Vingerhoets (2012) found 
that attachment avoidance styles were associated with greater wellbeing than attachment 
anxiety styles, and that higher reappraisal mediated this relationship for secure and 
attachment avoidance types, but suppression failed to function as a mediator at all.  
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Palm and Follette (2011), while not looking at attachment style directly but rather 
a population of individuals who had been interpersonally victimized, found that 
experiential avoidance (i.e., a deactivating strategy) and cognitive flexibility (i.e., a 
perspective-taking approach), mediated the relationship between interpersonal 
victimization and amount of psychological distress experienced. While this evidence does 
not directly support the idea that experiential avoidance and cognitive flexibility may 
mediate the relationship between attachment and distress, it is suggestive of the role of 
these strategies as mediators between vulnerable populations and psychological distress. 
While the importance of hyperactivating versus deactivating strategies as 
mediators between attachment style and mental health has been established, the findings 
have been mixed and pathways between attachment avoidance and mental health in 
particular have not been clearly delineated. This study seeks to explore the roles of three 
unique approaches to emotion regulation that may in part explain the relationships 
between the various attachment styles and mental health variables. Some evidence exists 
that rumination is a mediator between attachment anxiety and distress, and this study 
seems to replicate that finding. Experiential avoidance, which appears conceptually 
related to deactivating strategies, will be explored as a potential mediator in the 
relationship between attachment avoidance and lack of wellbeing. Finally, a new and 
important area of research and a primary goal of the study is investigating the potential 
mediating role of perspective-taking approaches in the relationships between attachment 
styles and mental health variables.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
The aim of the current study was to reveal the emotion regulation mechanisms by 
which internalized models of attachment exert their influence on adults’ mental health. It 
was expected that attachment anxiety would be related to distress and that this 
relationship would be mediated by both rumination and inversely by perspective-taking 
approaches. It was also expected that attachment avoidance would be inversely related to 
wellbeing and that this relationship would be mediated by both experiential avoidance 
and inversely by perspective-taking approaches. Using survey data from a sample of 
college students, structural equation modeling techniques (SEM) were used to examine 
the relationships between attachment styles, the use of various approaches to emotion 
regulation (i.e., perspective taking; hyper-activating; deactivating), and mental health 
variables (i.e., distress; wellbeing). Figure 1 depicts the proposed structural model. 
Further, because the study of perspective-taking and reappraisal approaches to emotion 
regulation is a relatively new area, this study sought to deepen understanding of this set 
of related constructs by exploring the structure and interrelationships of several different 
measures of perspective-taking.  
Formation of Latent Variables  
Latent variables were created to represent each of the study constructs. The 
creation of latent variables allowed for a large number of observed variables to be 
grouped together to represent a hypothetical, underlying construct. Latent variable 
analysis, which is akin to confirmatory factor analysis, allows researchers to better 
account for the individual contribution of each construct being measured, as well as to 
more precisely model measurement error (Bollen, 1989).  
Attachment style.  
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For the purposes of this study, the two dimensions of attachment styles—
attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance— were initially proposed as latent 
variables and measured using the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR-R).  
Emotion regulation: perspective-taking approaches.  
Five separate measures of perspective taking strategies were identified to 
potentially comprise the latent factor: Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire (BPAQ), 
Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA), Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire- Reappraisal subscale (ERQ-R), Experiences Questionnaire (EQ), and the 
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS). These particular measures were identified because a) 
they appear to be conceptually similar to one another but potentially still uniquely 
contributing to the underlying factor and b) empirical evidence is supportive of 
associations between the first three measures (Haner & Rude, 2015; Miller, Rude, & 
Haner, 2015).  
Emotion regulation: deactivating approaches.  
The Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ) was be 
used to assess EA, and EA will be treated as a hypothetical, overarching construct 
comprised of the following subscales that assess its unique facets: behavioral avoidance, 
distress aversion, repression/denial, distraction/suppression, procrastination, and distress 
endurance. All subscales have been shown to be moderately correlated with one another, 
but not so much so as to be tapping into the same construct. This made the measure ideal 
for latent variable modeling.   
Emotion regulation: hyperactivating approaches.  
The rumination subscale of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ-R) and the 
rumination subscale of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ) was used to measure hyper-
activating approaches (i.e., rumination).  
Mental health: psychological distress and wellbeing.  
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It was thought that psychological distress and wellbeing would comprise two 
latent factors that may be more meaningful and interpretable than an array of separate 
measures. The Mental Health Inventory (MHI) was used to assess the latent constructs of 
psychological distress and wellbeing, and its psychometric properties suggest that 1) 
these two constructs are related but indeed separate, and 2) that five correlated lower-
order factors consisting of anxiety, depression, loss of behavioral emotional control, 
general positive affect, and emotional ties exist, with the former three being lower-order 
factors of distress and the latter two of wellbeing.  
Research Questions  
This study explored the relationships among the constructs of attachment style, 
emotion regulation, and mental health, and examined the role of several emotion 
regulation strategies in mediating the relationship between attachment style and mental 
health as depicted in Figure 1. In the tradition of adult attachment research, attachment 
styles are not treated as categorical variables but rather as dimensions that an individual 
can be high or low on: High levels of either attachment anxiety or avoidance are 
interpreted as insecure attachment styles and, similarly, low levels of either attachment 
anxiety or avoidance are interpreted as secure attachment styles. The following specific 
research questions and predictions are explored:  
 
1. How is attachment style related to mental health variables (i.e., psychological distress, 
wellbeing)?  
a) Attachment anxiety is expected to be positively associated with psychological 
distress and weakly inversely associated with wellbeing.  
Rationale: That attachment anxiety is associated with increased symptoms of 
psychological distress and diminished wellbeing is well established in the literature and it 
is expected that these findings will be replicated (see Milkulincer & Shaver, 2007 for a 
review).  The positive association with distress is based on to the nature of attachment 
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anxiety itself, such that an individual high on anxious attachment is chronically 
hypervigilant to attachment-related threats, resulting in heightened levels of distress.  
That the relationship with wellbeing was expected to be weak was based on 
evidence that distress and wellbeing are related but distinct constructs (Veit & Ware, 
1983). One may experience heightened levels of distress in the context of interpersonal 
relationships yet still obtain fulfillment from hobbies and/or work life. Thus, it was 
thought that wellbeing would not be as impacted by attachment anxiety as would levels 
of distress.  
b) Attachment avoidance is expected to be inversely associated with wellbeing, 
and weakly associated with psychological distress.   
Rationale: Some studies show that attachment avoidance is related to depressive 
symptomology (e.g., Bifulco, Moran, Ball, & Bernazzani, 2002; Priel & Shamai, 1995), 
while some do not (e.g., Safford, Alloy, Crossfield, Morocco, & Wang, 2004). Further, 
some studies have shown that while attachment avoidance isn’t related to distress, it is 
associated with low levels of wellbeing (Kafestsios & Sideridis, 2006; Lavy & Littman-
Ovadia, 2011; Wei et al., 2011). Since a tenet of attachment avoidance is the drive to 
decrease contact with distress, it was expected that this particular association would be 
weak. On the other hand, it’s likely that fulfilling aspects of life are diminished in the 
pursuit of avoiding negative emotions (i.e., close relationships) and as such, this 
relationship was expected to be stronger.  
 
2. How is attachment style related to emotion regulation strategies?  
a) Attachment anxiety was expected to be positively associated with hyper-
activating strategies (i.e., rumination) and inversely associated with perspective 
taking.  
Rationale: Theoretical work posits that attachment anxiety is associated with the 
use of hyperactivating strategies (see Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003 for a review).  
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Empirical evidence for this relationship exists and is particularly strong for measures of 
rumination (Garrison, Hahn, Miller, & Sauer, 2014; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Saffrey 
& Ehrenberg, 2007). It is anticipated that this finding will be replicated.  
Individuals who are low on attachment anxiety are thought to manage emotions in 
a variety of adaptive ways, many of which center on psychological flexibility and in that 
way are similar to perspective taking. For instance, Waters (1999) suggested that 
individuals low on attachment anxiety are likely able to flexibly modify their approach to 
emotion regulation based on the environmental demands of a particular situation.  Further 
evidence comes from Mikulincer & Shaver (2007), who suggested that individuals who 
are low on attachment anxiety are likely to engage in flexible approaches to problem 
solving as well as in reappraisal. Thus, it was expected that attachment anxiety will be 
inversely associated with perspective-taking.  
b) Attachment avoidance is expected to be positively associated with deactivating 
strategies (i.e., experiential avoidance) and inversely associated with perspective taking. 
Rationale: An extensive body of theoretical work supports the idea that 
attachment avoidance is associated with the use of deactivating/suppressive emotion 
regulation strategies (see Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003 for a review). While 
experiential avoidance is a relatively new construct, it conceptually appears to function as 
a way of down-regulating negative emotions, at least in the short term, and so it is 
expected that attachment avoidance will be positively associated with EA.  
Much like hypothesis 2a, individuals who are low on attachment avoidance have 
also been shown to utilize adaptive emotion regulation strategies that are similar to 
perspective taking, such as reappraising the meaning of distressing situations and being 
cognitively flexibly in their application of emotion regulation strategies (Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007). As such, it was expected that attachment avoidance would be inversely 
associated with perspective-taking as well.  
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3. How are emotion regulation strategies related to mental health variables (psychological 
distress and wellbeing)?  
a) Hyperactivating ER strategies were expected to be moderately positively 
associated with psychological distress and weakly inversely associated with wellbeing.  
Rationale: Because extensive evidence suggests that hyperactivating strategies are 
positively associated with psychological distress variables, particularly in the context of 
rumination, depression, and anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 2000), it is expected that 
the relationship between hyperactivating ER strategies and distress will be strong in this 
study.  
A smaller body of empirical evidence suggests that rumination is associated with 
low levels of wellbeing (Harrington & Loffredo, 2010). Because relatively little is known 
about how rumination affects overall wellbeing, this relationship was proposed to be 
weak and somewhat exploratory.  
b) Experiential avoidance was expected to be moderately inversely associated 
with wellbeing and weakly associated with psychological distress.  
Rationale: While the avoidance of particular emotions, thoughts, and sensations 
reduces distress in the short-term, it is thought that remaining out of touch with parts of 
one’s experience can to low levels of wellbeing (Hayes et al., 2004; Bond et al., 2011). 
It’s also thought that EA may create a “rebound” effect,” wherein suppressed or denied 
negative emotions inevitably express themselves despite the individual’s attempts to stop 
the emotion process. Essentially, EA may relieve distress in the moment but could 
exacerbate it in the long term. Because EA has demonstrated a somewhat convoluted 
association with distress, this analysis was exploratory and it was anticipated that this 
complex relationship would be weak.    
The relationship with wellbeing, on the other hand, was thought to be strong. 
Theoretical and empirical work have suggested that when one chronically denies the 
experience of negative emotions, they consequently dull the experience of positive 
 47 
emotions as well, which are thought to be an integral component to overall wellbeing 
(Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008). Lastly, experiential avoidance is conceptualized as a 
multifaceted construct: In addition to the denial of negative emotions, individuals high on 
EA are likely to avoid any experience that could lead to emotional pain—including close 
relationships and the pursuit of meaningful goals, two other important facets of wellbeing 
(Hayes et al., 1996; Hayes et al., 2004).  
c) Perspective-taking approaches were expected to be positively associated with 
wellbeing and inversely associated with psychological distress. 
Rationale: Conceptually, perspective-taking approaches to emotion regulation 
have been thought of as adaptive and beneficial, in that their use may lead to overall 
lower levels of negative emotion and distress. Preliminary empirical evidence exists in 
support of this claim—big picture appraisal has been shown as inversely associated with 
negative affect and neuroticism, as well as positively associated with positive affect 
(Haner & Rude, 2015; Rude, Miller, & Haner, 2015). Another facet of perspective taking 
approaches, reappraisal, has been shown to lead to decreased levels of negative emotion 
experience and increased positive emotion experience (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
Decentering has been shown as inversely related to depressive symptomology (Fresco et 
al., 2006), as has cognitive flexibility (Dennis & Wal, 2010).   
 
4. Does emotion regulation mediate the relationship between attachment style and mental 
health variables? Several specific mediation relationships were proposed:  
a) Hyperactivating ER strategies were expected to mediate the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress. 
Rationale:  A study by Wei et al. (2005) found that the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and psychological distress (i.e., depression and anxiety) was mediated 
by hyperactivating approaches to affect-regulation. Because rumination is considered a 
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hyper-activating approach to ER, in that it increases the intensity and duration of negative 
affect, it is expected that these findings will be replicated.  
b) Deactivating ER strategies were expected to mediate the relationship between 
attachment avoidance and wellbeing.  
Rationale: Theoretical work suggests the inverse relationship between attachment 
avoidance and wellbeing may be via the association between attachment avoidance and 
deactivating ER strategies, like experiential avoidance, which has been thought to 
increase feelings of emptiness and inauthenticity and decrease feelings of life satisfaction 
and connectedness (Hayes et al., 2004). It is expected that these hypotheses will be 
supported in this study.     
c) Perspective taking was expected to mediate the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and distress. 
Rationale: It has been shown that the relative absence of attachment anxiety is 
associated with more adaptive ways of problem solving and regulating emotions, 
resulting in low levels of distress (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007 for a review). 
Perspective-taking approaches may be one of these adaptive strategies that has yet to be 
examined in this manner, as emotion regulation styles like big picture appraisal have been 
shown to be associated with low levels of negative affect (Haner & Rude, 2015).  This is 
likely due to the way in which perspective taking allows for an individual to consider 
multiple, alternative viewpoints when confronted with difficult situations. For instance, 
rather than accepting the first explanation of a failure that comes to mind (i.e., “I’m not 
good enough”), one may also consider that to fail is human and inevitable and in turn 
somewhat mitigate their distress. 
d) Perspective taking was expected to mediate the relationship between 
attachment avoidance and wellbeing.   
Rationale: Similarly, it has been shown that the relative absence of attachment 
avoidance is associated with more adaptive ways of problem solving and regulating 
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emotions, resulting in higher levels of wellbeing (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007 for a 
review). Perspective-taking approaches may be one of these adaptive strategies that has 
yet to be examined, as constructs like big picture appraisal are thought to be associated 
with high levels of positive affect and an overall high quality of life. See hypothesis 4c 
for a rationale.    
 
5. An individual’s current degree of life stressors was expected to moderate the 
relationship between attachment style, emotion regulation, and psychological distress, 
such that the mediation is stronger under conditions of high life stress.  
Rationale: According to Bowlby (1973, 1969/1982), the attachment system is 
“activated” by particular environmental threats—meaning that the attachment system—
including the emotion-regulation strategies associated with particular attachment styles— 
is not always “online” and dictating cognitions and emotions, but rather becomes 
engaged under conditions of stress. Conceptually, this framework lends itself to the 
hypothesis that the mediating role of emotion regulation in the relationship between 
attachment style and mental health variables will be stronger under conditions of high life 
stress.  
Participants  
Six hundred and two undergraduate students (50% women) enrolled in an upper-
division educational psychology course completed a battery of anonymous questionnaires 
about “Ways of Coping” in exchange for course credit. Demographics for participants are 
presented in Table 1.  Participants were not excluded based on any demographic 
variables. The sample is comprised of individuals from a multiple racial and ethnic 
backgrounds and various socioeconomic statuses. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that 46% of all participants are of Caucasian/ European-American 
background and 78% of all participants consider themselves to be from middle- or upper-
middle class backgrounds. Table 2 presents participants’ perceived SES (i.e., subjective 
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interpretation based on money, education, and jobs). Of note, 88% of participants rated 
themselves at a “5” or above, with “1” being the “worst off” and “10” being the “best 
off.” 
Procedure 
Participants were informed of the purpose of the study, and consent was obtained. 
Data collection occurred over the course of one session. A series of self-report measures, 
as well as one cognitive processing measure, were administered in an online survey. The 
survey took approximately 30 to 45 minutes to complete.  
Measures 
In addition to demographic questions assessing participants’ gender, race, 
ethnicity, relationship status, the following measures were administered. When 
applicable, measures are clustered into those expected to form a latent factor.  
Measure of perceived socioeconomic status.  
The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status. The MacArthur Scale of 
Subjective Social Status questionnaire is a measure of perceived socioeconomic status 
that aims to capture individuals’ “sense of their place in the social ladder which takes into 
account standing on multiple dimensions of socioeconomic status and social position” 
(Adler & Stewart, 2007). Participants were asked to indicate their perceived 
socioeconomic status on a ten-point scale. Participants read the following instructions: 
“The highest number (10) represents the people who are the best off, those who have the 
most money, most education, and best jobs. At the bottom (1) are the people who are the 
worst off, those who have the least money, least education, and worst jobs or no job. 
Please indicate the number that best reflects your situation.”  
Measure of attachment style.  
Experiences in Close Relationships- Revised (ECR-R) Adult Attachment 
Questionnaire.  The Experiences in Close Relationships- Revised (ECR-R; Fraley, 
Waller, & Brennan, 2000) questionnaire is a revised version of Brennan, Clark, and 
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Shaver’s (1998) Experiences in Close Relationships (ECR) questionnaire. The items on 
the ECR-R were selected using Item Response Theory, but were selected from the same 
item pool as those from the original ECR. The measure is designed to assess individual 
differences with respect to attachment-related anxiety (i.e., the extent to which people are 
insecure vs. secure about the availability and responsiveness of romantic partners) and 
attachment-related avoidance (i.e., the extent to which people are uncomfortable being 
close to others vs. secure depending on others). The 18-item anxiety subscale consists of 
items such as “I’m afraid that I will lose my partner’s love” and “I worry a lot about my 
relationships.” The 18-item avoidance subscale consists of items such as “I prefer not to 
be too close to romantic partners,” and “It helps to turn to my partner in times of need.” 
Totals are computed by averaging the scores for all items within each scale, with higher 
scores representing higher an increased level of the corresponding construct. Internal 
consistency reliability tends to be .90 or higher for the two ECR-R scales.  
Measures of perspective taking approaches.  
Reappraisal Subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ).  The 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) was created to assess suppression and 
reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003). The 6 reappraisal subscale includes items such as, “I 
control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I am in.” Items that 
are answered using a 7-point Likert scale, on which ranges from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree.  Gross and John (2003) report that the reappraisal subscale has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .79 and demonstrates satisfactory convergent and discriminate 
validity (Gross & John, 2003).   
Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire (BPAQ). The instructions ask respondents to 
think back to situations in which they have been upset or unhappy and to characterize the 
way they usually respond in such situations by rating each of the 23 items on a 5-point 
scale, ranging from “never” to “very frequently.”. Items are included tapping each of the 
three dimensions reported here (e.g., extended time perspective: “I remind myself that if I 
 52 
wait it out I will eventually feel better;” broader context of life and self: “I realize that 
this is only part of who I am;” and broader human context: “I know that others experience 
feelings like mine.”). In several samples, the BPQ has shown good internal consistency 
and convergent- discriminant validity (Gill et al., 2016). 
Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA). This measure of 
Big Picture Appraisal was modeled after an established measure of depressive cognitive 
biases, the SST (Rude, Durham-Fowler, Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 2010; Wenzlaff; 
1988, 1993; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweat, 2001). As in the original SST, 
items developed for the SST-BPA were groups of 6 words (e.g., “temporary is bad think 
pain I”) that respondents unscramble by placing numbers above each word to reflect the 
chosen word ordering (e.g., “I think pain is temporary” or “I think pain is bad”). Items 
(e.g., “me every like no feels person”) were constructed to allow formation of sentences 
judged consistent with BPA (e.g., “Every person feels like me”) or inconsistent with BPA 
(e.g., “No person feels like me”). Across several studies, the SST-BPA has shown good 
internal consistency and convergent-discriminant validity (Haner, Rude, Miller, 2015).  
Experiences Questionnaire- Decentering Subscale (EQ-D). The Experiences 
Questionnaire is a self-report inventory that was designed to measure decentering and 
rumination (Fresco et al., 2007). The measure consists of 20-items comprising two 
subscales, decentering and rumination, and examples of items are “I am better able to 
accept myself as I am,” (decentering) and, “I think over and over again about what others 
have said to me,” (rumination) with high scores representing an increased level of the 
corresponding construct. Internal consistencies for the decentering and rumination 
subscales are high (r = .81, respectively) (Fresco et al., 2007).  
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory. The CFI is a 20-item scale developed to measure 
the cognitive flexibility necessary to successfully modulate maladaptive beliefs and 
generate adaptive thinking (Dennis & Wal, 2010). A 7-point Likert scale was used 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), with higher scores indicative of greater 
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cognitive flexibility, and lower scores indicative of less cognitive flexibility. Two factors 
were indicated in the CFI: Control (i.e., tendency to perceive difficult situations as 
controllable), which had a Cronbach's alpha of .85 and Alternatives (i.e., the ability to 
perceive multiple alternative explanations for life occurrences, human behavior), which 
had a Cronbach’s alpha of .91. Examples of items include “I often look at a situation 
from different viewpoints” (alternatives) and “I feel I have no power to change things in 
difficult situations” (control).   
Measures of hyperactivating strategies.  
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) is a 
subscale of the Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  
It is a 22-item self-report inventory that examines responses to a depressed mood, with 
items focused on the self, symptoms, or consequences of the mood.  For example, items 
include  “Think about how alone you feel” and “Analyze recent events to try to 
understand why I am depressed,” with answer choices ranging from “almost never” to 
“almost always,” with high scores representing increased use of rumination. It has been 
shown to have good internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89.  
Experiences Questionnaire- Rumination subscale (EQ-R). Described in the above 
section. 
Measures of deactivating strategies.   
The Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ). The 
MEAQ (Gámez, Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011) is a 62-item measure 
of experiential avoidance that comprises six subscales: Behavioral Avoidance, defined as 
situational avoidance of physical discomfort and distress (e.g., “I won’t do something if I 
think it will make me uncomfortable”); Distress Aversion, defined as non-acceptance of 
or negative attitudes toward distress (e.g., Happiness means never feeling any pain or 
discomfort”); Procrastination, defined as delaying activities that may cause distress (e.g., 
I tend to put off unpleasant things that need to get done”);  Distraction / Suppression, 
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defined as attempts to ignore or suppress distress (e.g., When something upsetting comes 
up, I try very hard to stop thinking about it”); Repression/Denial, defined as distancing 
and dissociating from distress (e.g., I sometimes have difficulty identifying how I feel); 
and Distress Endurance, defined as a willingness to engage in behavior that is consistent 
with one’s values even when in distress (e.g., People should face their fears). Items are 
rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The 
subscales show evidence of good internal consistency, and the total score is both (a) 
associated with related measures of avoidance and (b) distinguishable from negative 
emotionality. 
Measure of mental health.   
Mental Health Inventory (MHI). The MHI (Veit & Ware, 1983) is a 38-item 
measure assessing mental health, as broken down into the two categories of 
psychological distress and psychological wellbeing. The structure of the MHI was 
initially identified by a factor analysis, and psychological distress was divided into three 
factors: anxiety (very nervous person, tense or high strung), depression (moody, low 
spirits), and loss of behavioral and emotional control (concern about losing control of 
mind, felt emotionally stable). Psychological wellbeing was divided into two factors: 
general positive affect (happy person, relaxed and free of tension) and emotional ties (felt 
loved and wanted, time felt lonely). Patients were instructed to indicate how they have 
been feeling in the past month on a 5- or 6-point Likert scale. Internal consistency 
estimates for each of the subscales range from .92 to .96, and test-retest reliability is good 
with stability coefficients ranging from .56 to .64.  
Measure of life stress.   
The Social Readjustment Rating Scale – Modified for College Students (SRRS). 
The Social Readjustment Rating Scale (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) is a widely utilized 
measure of stressful life events in adults that has been modified for use in a population of 
college students. Participants are asked to check a box next to each event they have 
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experienced in the past year. The possible 32 events range from “death of a close family   
member, with a mean value of 100, and the latter being ranked as least stressful, with a 
mean value of 20. Values are summed for a total score that results in a classification of 
mild stress (total <150), and severe stress (total>300).  
Analytic Approach   
Primary model.  
Structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques were conducted using IBM SPSS 
version 22 and Mplus version 8 software (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) in order to test 
relationships among the study constructs. Maximum likelihood (ML), a robust and 
commonly used estimation, was used throughout analyses (Harris and Stocker, p. 828, 
1998).  
SEM contains two main components: a measurement model and a structural 
model (i.e., path model) (Crowley & Fan, 1997; Weston & Gore, 2006). The 
measurement model explains the “relationships between observed variables and the 
construct or constructs those variables are hypothesized to measure.” The structural 
model refers to the paths among all proposed constructs (p. 724). Taken together, the 
measurement model and structural model constitute the full structural model.   
Six steps outlined by Weston and Gore (2006) were followed in order to test the 
model using an SEM approach: model specification, identification, estimation, 
evaluation, and respecification. Following the two-step approach to modeling detailed by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988), each step was performed for measurement part of the 
model prior to being performed on the structural model. When respecification to each 
part of the model was necessary, the last three steps were repeated until an acceptable 
model was found.  
 In the first step, model specification, the hypothesized relationships between latent 
variables and their indicators (i.e., the measurement model) were determined. Following 
this, the hypothesized paths between variables of interest (i.e., the structural model) were 
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determined. In step two, model identification was evaluated to determine how many free 
parameters (i.e., unknowns) and how many observations (i.e., knowns) were in each part 
of the model. A model is considered under-identified if there are more free parameters 
than observations, just-identified if there are an equal number of free parameters and 
observations, and over-identified if there are more observations than free parameters. 
Both parts of the model were over-identified, making it possible for model fit and 
parameter estimates to be evaluated (Kline, 2016, p.119).  
Steps three and four, model estimation (i.e., running the analyses) and model 
evaluation (i.e., determining whether the model fits the data well) naturally occurred 
somewhat simultaneously. Due to poor initial model fit and multiple low factor loadings, 
the measurement model was respecified (i.e., indicators that did not load on to their 
respective factors were dropped). The measurement model was then re-estimated, re-
evaluated, and found to be acceptable. Once an acceptable measurement model was 
identified, a parallel process was applied to the structural part of the model (with 
modifications to its measurement part), as it also initially demonstrated unsatisfactory 
model fit. Of note, it is standard for respecification to either part of the model to be based 
on both theory- and data-driven conclusions.  
Evaluating and Comparing Models.    
Model fit was evaluated based on 1) factor inter-correlations, 2) direction and 
magnitude of the parameter estimates, and 3) global fit indices (Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation [RMSEA], Comparative Fit Index [CFI]). Standards for fit indices 
cutoffs were based on Hu and Bentler (1998) and Kline (2004) and are as follows: 
RMSEA <.08, CFI > .90. The CFI value can range from 0 to 1, and Hu and Bentler 
(1995) suggest that CFI values above .95 are optimal, while Kline (2004) later added that 
values above .90 are acceptable. The RMSEA also has values that range from 0 to 1. Hu 
and Bentler (1998) state that values lower than .06 are ideal but later (1999) added that 
values up to .08 are adequate. Of note, the chi-square test of model fit that is commonly 
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evaluated alongside CFI and RMSEA to determine model fit was not considered in this 
study due to its unreliability in measuring model fit for sample sizes above ~200. This is 
because as sample size increases, so does the likelihood of a significant chi-square value, 
indicating the model does not fit the data well (Barrett, 2007).  
As anticipated in latent factor modeling, multiple competing models emerged 
during analysis. For example, when an initial model was estimated and found to have 
poor model fit during evaluation, it was then respecified to include additional parameters 
(e.g., a path between an independent variable and a mediating variable). Additional 
parameters were considered if they were suggested both by empirical tests of 
misspecification (i.e., modification indices) provided by Mplus and were theoretically 
meaningful.  
Following SEM best practices, these “competing” models were compared to one 
another by evaluating both global fit indies and chi-square difference tests (not sensitive 
to sample size). The chi-square difference test assumes there is no significant difference 
between the models. Thus, if the chi-square difference test was significant, the null 
hypothesis was rejected and the model was respecified to include the additional 
parameter(s). Importantly, chi-square difference tests were only performed on “nested” 
models (i.e., model A is nested in Model B if the parameters in Model A are a subset of 
the parameters in Model B).  
Multiple Group Analysis.  
Multiple Group Analysis (MGA) was utilized in order to test for the moderating 
effect of life stress on all proposed mediations (see section titled, Research Questions and 
Hypotheses). MGA allows for testing whether modeled relationships differ by group, and 
in this study, the groups examined were “high stress” and “low stress.” The life stress 
variable was initially continuous; However, it was artificially dichotomized for the 
purposes of analysis because there was not enough power (i.e., not enough participants in 
the study) to test for moderated mediation with a continuous moderator and latent 
 58 
mediators. The “high stress” group consisted of the top 25% of scores and the “low 
stress” group consisted of the bottom 75% of scores.  
First, the fully unconstrained model was run (i.e., all paths were free to vary by 
group). Next, all paths were constrained to be equal across group and all ten mediation 
paths were tested individually so that it would be clear which mediations differed 
significantly between groups. If the Wald Test of Parameter Constraints was significant 
for any path, standardized indirect effect values were examined for each group to 
determine whether the mediation was stronger for the “high stress” or “low stress” group. 
Of note, a conservative p value of .005 was used to determine whether the Wald Test was 
significant. Since ten individual paths were being tested, it was necessary to adjust for 
pairwise error and thus the standard value of .05 was divided by ten.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
Data Screening and Cleaning 
All data screening and analysis procedures were conducted using IBM SPSS 
Statistics Version 22. Seven hundred and ninety-five participants began the survey. 
However, data were only usable for 602 participants. The 193 cases that were not 
downloaded were either incomplete (i.e., the response pattern revealed the participant 
failed to complete the survey) or were duplicate cases. Data were then checked for 
validity: Two questions were included that assessed for validity (i.e., How honestly and 
accurately did you respond to the questions; How carefully and thoughtfully did you 
respond to the questions). Participants (n=15) who responded “not at all” in response to 
either item were eliminated from the dataset. Next, the data were checked for any missing 
values. Because the survey required participants to answer one question before advancing 
to the next, missing values were only present in the items assessing relationship status 
and honesty and accuracy. This was due to the items erroneously not forcing a response. 
Participants who did not respond to relationship status but otherwise completed the 
survey were retained in the dataset. Two participants did not respond to the items 
assessing for honesty and accuracy in responding, and because it was impossible to 
determine the validity of their responses, their data were eliminated.  
The 585 cases retained for analysis were then checked for non-normality, as SEM 
assumes data are normally distributed. Histograms, QQ plots, and skewness and kurtosis 
values were examined for all measures used as indicators in the model. In some instances, 
like for the BPAQ, these were total scale scores. In other instances, these were total 
subscale scores, as in the case of the six subscales of the MEAQ. All were found to be 
normally distributed.  
Scale reliability analyses were then conducted for each questionnaire total score 
or subscale score that was planned for use in the model. All measures were found to be 
reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of .8 or above with one exception: A subscale of the 
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measure of “wellbeing,” called emotional ties (a = .55) was found to have inadequate 
reliability. This indicator of “wellbeing,” which appeared to measure quality of 
interpersonal relationships (e.g., “My relationships are full and complete”), was 
eliminated from the dataset. As “wellbeing” only had two indicators, this left only one 
indicator, general positive affect. Thus, “wellbeing” was modeled as a single indicator 
variable (i.e., observed variable). This modification had important implications for the 
model, as it meant that the model was no longer a fully latent model and was from then 
on considered to be partially latent (i.e., comprised of both multiple- and single-indicator 
variables).  
Measurement Model  
Specification.  
The proposed measurement model consisted of seven latent variables (attachment 
anxiety, attachment avoidance, perspective-taking strategies, hyperactivating 
strategies/rumination, deactivating strategies/experiential avoidance, psychological 
distress, wellbeing). While each latent variable was initially proposed using multiple 
indicators in order to reduce measurement error, the latent variable “wellbeing” was 
alternatively modeled as an observed variable (see above section, Data Screening and 
Cleaning) for an explanation.  
Due to poor psychometric properties of most self-report measures of adult 
attachment, this construct was assessed using only the ECRS. Thus, a technique called 
“parceling” was performed in order to create multiple indicators for the ECRS. 
“Parceling” consisted of first performing an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the 18-
item attachment anxiety subscale and the 18-item attachment avoidance subscale.  Three 
parcels, each made up of the mean of six items, were created for each factor by first 
examining each item’s loading onto its respective factor. Items with a range of factor 
loadings were selected to be grouped into a single parcel, ensuring that one parcel did not 
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consist of all items with the highest factor loadings or vice versa (Russel et al., 1998; 
Wei, Vogel, et al., 2005).  
Identification.  
Identification of the measurement model was evaluated using the requirements 
described by Kenny et al. (1998), such that there were at least two indicators for each 
latent factor and the model was overidentified. The difference between the number of 
observations and parameters (i.e., degrees of freedom) was determined by first using the 
equation p = v (v+1) /2 to determine the number of observations (i.e., the number of 
variances and unique covariances) in the model. The difference between the number of 
observations and the number of free parameters was greater than zero and thus the model 
was found to be overidentified (i.e., the number of observations should be greater than 
the number of free parameters). That the model was overidentified meant that there was 
more than enough information in the data to estimate all model parameters, making it 
possible to evaluate the model’s fit to the data and ultimately support or fail to support 
the hypotheses.   
Estimation.  
To estimate the measurement model, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with 
all latent constructs was performed to determine whether the measurement model was a 
satisfactory fit for the data. Global fit indices and factor loadings of indicators on to 
appropriate latent variables were evaluated. The first attempt at model estimation 
revealed that the latent factors “attachment anxiety” and “attachment avoidance,” both of 
which were created using parceling, resulted in a “not positive definite covariance 
matrix” and therefore the analyses could not run. The not positive definite covariance 
matrix likely occurred because of linear dependency among the indicator variables (i.e., 
parcels), such that some variables were perfectly predicted by others. These constructs 
were alternatively modeled as observed variables. The model was then estimated with no 
other modifications and demonstrated inadequate model fit (c2=703.32; CFI= .84; 
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RMSEA= .123, 90% CI = .115, .132). As the global fit indices were inadequate and 
multiple factor loadings were low (See Supplemental Table 2 for factor loadings of the 
proposed measurement model), this initial model was determined to be unsatisfactory and 
was subsequently respecified.  
Respecification.  
After examining global fit indices and factor loadings for each indicator of the 
latent constructs, modifications were made to the model to improve its fit to the data. 
Indicators that did not demonstrate an adequate factor loading were automatically 
dropped from the model. The cut off point for an adequate factor loading was based on 
Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma (2003), who suggest that indicators with loadings at or 
below .4 should be dropped. One indicator of “hyperactivating strategies,” the 
Experiences Questionnaire- Rumination, displayed an inadequate factor loading of .28. 
Because “hyperactivating strategies” only had two indicators, dropping this indicator 
resulted in the latent variable being alternatively modeled as an observed variable (i.e., 
the total score of the Ruminative Response Scale). Two indicators of “deactivating 
strategies” (subscales of the Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire 
called procrastination and distress endurance) also displayed unsatisfactory factor 
loadings of .43 and .38, respectively. These indicators were also dropped from the factor.  
Another indicator of “deactivating strategies,” distraction and suppression, had a 
factor loading of .52. While this loading was above the .40 cutoff suggested by 
Netemeyer et al. (2003), this indicator appeared to conceptually differ from the other 
indicators of the same latent variable. While other indicators reflected more rigid and 
extreme forms of experiential avoidance (“I avoid activities if there is even a small 
possibility of getting hurt;” “If I could magically remove all of my painful memories, I 
would”), this indicator seemed to reflect an emotion regulation strategy that can be used 
flexibly and has been shown to be adaptive in the short term (Gross, 2002) distraction 
(e.g., “When an upsetting memory comes up, I try to focus on something else”). 
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Distraction from unpleasant memories while trying to complete a task at work, for 
instance, is adaptive because it allows you to complete a desired task. Because of the 
conceptual differences from other indicators of the same factor and the relatively low 
factor loading, it was dropped from the model.  
Estimation of Respecified Measurement Model.   
The respecified measurement model included three of the seven proposed latent 
factors. All indicators of “perspective taking” and “distress” were retained. Three 
indicators (behavioral avoidance; distress aversion; repression/denial) were retained for 
“deactivating strategies.” The other four proposed latent factors (i.e., attachment 
avoidance, attachment anxiety, hyperactivating strategies, wellbeing) were alternatively 
modeled as observed variables.  
After respecifications were made, the measurement model was re-estimated re-
evaluated. The respecified model demonstrated factor loadings of above .4 for all 
indicators as well as adequate fit (c2=120.69.10; CFI= .95; RMSEA= .08, 90% CI = .074, 
.093). Bivariate correlations, standard deviations, and means among retained observed 
variables are presented in Table 3. Final factor loadings of the indicators on the latent 
variables are presented in Table 5. 
Structural Model   
Based on the two-step modeling process detailed by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988), the proposed structural model used for initial analyses incorporated modifications 
to the measurement part. This model, Model A, is presented in Figure 1.  
Specification.  
Relationships among variables of interest were specified, including the 
hypothesized directionality of the paths and whether the relationships were expected to be 
positive or negative. (See the section titled, “Research Questions and Hypotheses” for a 
detailed rationale for the specification of the structural model).  
Identification. 
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 Model A was evaluated for identification. For purposes of determining 
identification, the structural part of the model is treated as a “path model,” which 
identifies relationships between the key model constructs. Using the same process that 
was used for the measurement model, the structural part was also determined to be 
overidentified (i.e., it had more observations than parameters).  
Estimation.  
Once a satisfactory measurement model was obtained, the full structural model 
(i.e., the measurement part and the structural part) was evaluated in order to determine 
how well the hypothesized model fit the data. Model A did not fit the data well as 
evidenced by global fit indices, (c2=530.477; CFI= .874; RMSEA= .108, 90% CI = .099, 
.116).   
Respecification.  
The structural model was respecified in order to improve the fit of the model to 
the data. First, modification indices (i.e., value estimates generated by Mplus that suggest 
the addition and/or subtraction of parameters to improve fit) were examined to determine 
whether the addition of specific parameters would improve model fit. Suggested 
parameters were estimated only if relationships between the variables were supported by 
theory. One path was added to the model along with three correlated residuals. These 
were added to the model one at a time and were incorporated into the respecified model if 
a chi-square difference test between the models was significant, as this suggested that the 
bigger model fit the data significantly better than the smaller model.  Based on these 
criteria, the following modifications were made: 
1. A direct path between attachment anxiety to experiential avoidance  
Attachment anxiety is thought to be associated with high levels of distress in 
response to attachment needs not being met, and experiential avoidance functions to 
decrease contact with experiences, thoughts, and emotions deemed distressing. It’s 
reasonable to think that individuals high on attachment anxiety would utilize particular 
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facets of experiential avoidance (e.g., “When I am hurting, I would do anything to feel 
better”) when the use of hyperactivating ER strategies fail to result in attachment needs 
being met.  
2. Correlated residuals of all mediator variables (hyperactivating with 
deactivating; hyperactivating with perspective taking; deactivating with 
perspective taking).  
Muthén & Muthén suggest recommend correlating the residuals of the mediators 
as a default approach to modeling. Their rationale is that there are likely multiple 
predictors not included in the model that are influencing the mediators. In an effort to 
account for other potential sources of variation and avoid distorted parameter estimates, 
all three mediator variables’ residuals were correlated.  
Estimation of Respecified Structural Model.  
Model B, the final modified model which incorporated the three additional 
parameters, was estimated and global fit indices were examined and found to be 
satisfactory, (c2=331.70; CFI= .927; RMSEA= .086, 90% CI = .077, .095). In addition to 
improved CFI and RMSEA, results of chi-square difference testing of the nested models 
(Model A was nested in Model B) was significant, suggesting Model B had significantly 
better fit to the data than Model A (See Table 4). Because adequate model fit was 
achieved, all parameter estimates in Model B could be interpreted.   
Examination of Study Hypotheses 
Research Question 1: How is Adult Attachment Style Related to Mental 
Health Variables  
It was hypothesized that attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance would be 
asymmetrically related to distress and wellbeing (modeled as the single indicator 
variable, positive affect). Specifically, attachment anxiety was expected to be positively 
associated with psychological distress and weakly associated with wellbeing, and 
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attachment avoidance was expected to be inversely associated with wellbeing and weakly 
associated with psychological distress (see Figure 1).  
As predicted, attachment anxiety was positively associated with distress (β = .10, 
p = .003). Whereas, attachment anxiety was expected to be weakly related to wellbeing, it 
showed no relationship to the indicator of wellbeing, positive affect (β = -.02, p = .187).  
Similarly, attachment avoidance was inversely associated with positive affect (β = 
-.12, p = .005) as anticipated, but it was unrelated to distress (β = .02, p = .651) (See 
Figure 2).  
Research Question 2: How is Adult Attachment Related to Emotion 
Regulation Styles  
Attachment anxiety was expected to be positively associated with hyperactivating 
ER strategies (modeled as the single indicator variable, rumination), while attachment 
avoidance was expected to be positively associated with deactivating ER strategies (i.e., 
experiential avoidance). Both attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance were 
expected to be inversely associated with perspective taking (See Figure 1).  
As predicted, attachment anxiety was positively associated with hyperactivating 
ER strategies (β = .44, p = .000) and attachment avoidance was positively associated with 
deactivating ER strategies (β = .127, p = .004). As was also predicted, both attachment 
anxiety (β = -.170, p = .000) and attachment avoidance (β = -.200, p = .000) were 
inversely associated with perspective taking (See Figure 2).  
Although a relationship between attachment anxiety and experiential avoidance 
was not initially proposed, modification indices and conceptual knowledge suggested that 
attachment anxiety is not only strongly associate with the hyperactivating ER strategy 
rumination, but also with the deactivating ER strategy, experiential avoidance. The path 
was estimated (β = .31, p = .000) and found to be significant.  
   Research Question 3: How are Emotion Regulation Styles Related to 
Mental Health  
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It was hypothesized that hyperactivating ER strategies and deactivating ER 
strategies would be asymmetrically related to distress and wellbeing. Specifically, 
hyperactivating ER strategies were expected to be moderately positively associated with 
psychological distress while deactivating strategies were anticipated to be moderately 
inversely associated with wellbeing. Hyperactivating ER strategies were also expected to 
be weakly inversely associated with wellbeing while deactivating strategies were 
expected to be moderately inversely associated with wellbeing. Lastly, perspective taking 
was expected to be positively associated with wellbeing and inversely associated with 
psychological distress (See Figure 1).  
As predicted, hyperactivating ER strategies were moderately positively associated 
with distress (β = 43, p = .000) and weakly inversely associated with wellbeing (β = -.11, 
p = .01). Deactivating strategies were more positively associated with distress than 
anticipated (β = 31, p = .000), and, contrary to the prediction, deactivating strategies were 
not associated with wellbeing (β = -.06, p = .206). As anticipated, perspective taking was 
positively associated with wellbeing (β = .56, p = .000) and inversely associated with 
psychological distress (β = -.24, p = .000) (See Figure 2).  
Research Question 4: Does Emotion Regulation Mediate the Relationship 
between Adult Attachment and Mental Health  
Four separate mediations were proposed:  
1) Hyperactivating ER strategies were expected to mediate the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and distress.  
Contrary to what was hypothesized, the direct effect from attachment anxiety to distress 
(β = .11, p = .003) did not decrease after including rumination in the model (β = .19, p = 
.000), suggesting no evidence of full or partial mediation.  
2) Deactivating ER strategies were expected to mediate the relationship between 
attachment avoidance and wellbeing.   
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While the direct effect from attachment avoidance to wellbeing (β = -.09, p = .015) 
decreased after including deactivating ER strategies in the model (β = .01, p = .243), the 
specific indirect effect was nonsignificant, suggesting no evidence of full or partial 
mediation.  
3) Perspective taking was expected to mediate the relationship between attachment 
anxiety and distress.  
As hypothesized, evidence emerged of a significant, partial indirect (i.e., mediated) effect 
of perspective taking on the relationship between attachment anxiety and distress. The 
direct effect of attachment anxiety on distress (β = .10, p = .003) decreased after 
including perspective taking in the model, and the specific indirect effect was significant 
(β = .04, p = .001) (See Table 6).  
4) Perspective taking was expected to mediate the relationship between attachment 
avoidance and wellbeing.   
Inconsistent with the prediction, the direct effect from attachment avoidance to wellbeing 
(β = -.11, p = .005) did not decrease after including perspective taking in the model (β = -
11, p = .000), suggesting no evidence of full or partial mediation.  
Research Question 5: Does Life Stress Moderate the Relationship between 
Attachment Style, Emotion Regulation, and Distress  
It was predicted that an individual’s current degree of life stress would moderate 
the relationships between attachment style, emotion regulation, and psychological 
distress, such that the mediations would be stronger under conditions of high life stress 
(See Figure 1).   
A MGA was run for each of the ten relevant mediation paths in order to determine 
whether mediations differed in strength between high stress and low stress groups. Based 
on a conservative p-value of .005 to adjust for pairwise error, all Wald Tests of Parameter 
Constraints were nonsignificant, suggesting that there was not a detectable difference 
between the high and low stress group when examining the relationship between adult 
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attachment, emotion regulation, and mental health. However, it’s notable that the 
mediation path involving attachment anxiety, hyperactivating strategies, and wellbeing 
trended towards significance (WSdiff= 7.062, df=1, p = .008).   
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
It’s widely accepted that the quality of the bonds we form in childhood persist to 
some degree into adulthood, and moreover, continue to impact interpersonal relationships 
and mental health. While a vast body of theoretical and empirical work has informed our 
understanding of attachment style and mental health, the exact mechanisms through 
which attachment continues to exert its influence on psychological outcomes throughout 
the lifespan is yet to be fully understood. In other words, it is most likely that attachment 
style does not exert its influence on adults’ mental health directly, but rather impacts 
mental health through a number of mediating variables. This is particularly important 
when considering that attachment style is thought to be relatively stable throughout the 
lifespan. Focusing on a more malleable trait, like cognitive and emotional mediating 
variables, could prove more effective when treating individuals whose primary symptoms 
stem from early relational trauma.  
When considering potential cognitive and emotional mediators, the proposed 
model relied on a basic tenet of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980): 
Attachment theory (AT) has been broadly defined as a theory of how individuals develop 
patterns of affect regulation (Main, 1990) in childhood that carry into adulthood. An idea 
that has recently gained currency and is discussed in the literature review is that affect 
regulation (AR) is nearly synonymous with emotion regulation (ER), a cognitive theory 
of how individuals manage emotions (Gross, 1998, 2002, 2010). Based on this, the 
current model tested the idea that insecurely attached adults develop unhelpful ER 
strategies in response to early, problematic relationships with primary caregivers, and that 
these particular ER strategies explain the relationship between insecure attachment styles 
and poor mental health outcomes (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007 for a review). Prior 
evidence discussed in the literature review supported the expectation that the reported use 
of hyperactivating strategies to ER (i.e., rumination) would mediate the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress, and that reported use of deactivating strategies 
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(i.e., experiential avoidance) would mediate the relationship between attachment 
avoidance and wellbeing (see Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003 for a review). 
In addition to proposed mediations supported by previous findings, the 
hypothesized model also included a number of novel, exploratory mediations regarding a 
potentially helpful ER strategy termed perspective taking, which is broadly defined as the 
ability to consider multiple, alternative interpretations of distressing situations and 
emotions. As discussed in the literature review, it was generally thought that perspective 
taking would mediate the relationship between adult attachment and mental health 
outcomes. Since perspective taking shares similarities with how attachment secure 
individuals have reported navigating life’s challenges (e.g., approaching problems in a 
variety of ways depending on the context of the situation) (Waters, 1999; Zimmerman, 
1999), a conceptual case was made for the expectation that perspective taking abilities 
would mediate the relationship between high levels of attachment avoidance and/or 
attachment anxiety and poor mental health outcomes. Specifically, it was expected that 
perspective taking would inversely mediate the relationship between avoidant attachment 
and wellbeing and would positively mediate the relationship between attachment anxiety 
and distress. 
Lastly, it was thought that an individual’s current degree of life stress would 
impact the relationship between adult attachment, emotion regulation, and mental health. 
Specifically, it was expected that the strength of the proposed mediations would increase 
as life stress increased. As previously discussed, this made sense given that life stress has 
been thought to activate the attachment system and consequently increase dependency on 
attachment related ER strategies (Bowlby 1973, 1969/1982).  
The Current Study  
Overall, the results of the current study supported existing evidence that insecure 
attachment styles are associated with psychological difficulties. As expected, attachment 
anxiety was associated with heighted levels of distress and attachment avoidance was 
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associated with low levels of wellbeing. Results also supported the notion that ER is 
uniquely associated with both attachment style and mental health. As expected, 
attachment anxiety was associated with the hyperactivating ER strategy, rumination, and 
rumination was also associated with heightened levels of distress. As was also 
anticipated, attachment avoidance was associated with the deactivating ER strategy, 
experiential avoidance.  
The central emotion regulation construct of interest, perspective taking, 
demonstrated a relationship with both adult attachment and mental health. As expected, it 
was inversely associated with both attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance. It was 
also positively associated with wellbeing and inversely associated with distress. These 
findings regarding perspective taking not only shed light on the nature of the construct 
itself, but also add a unique dimension to our understanding of attachment, ER, and 
mental health.  
Results of the current study also found evidence for direct relationships that were 
not hypothesized—specifically, attachment anxiety was positively associated with 
experiential avoidance, and experiential avoidance was not associated with wellbeing but 
was instead associated with heightened levels of distress. Later sections will address 
possible reasons for and implications of these unanticipated relationships.   
While the majority of the proposed direct associations yielded expected results, 
the results of the proposed mediations varied. In contrast to what was hypothesized, 
hyperactivating ER strategies and deactivating ER strategies did not mediate any of the 
proposed paths between attachment and mental health. However, evidence did emerge for 
one partial mediation: Perspective taking was found to partially mediate the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress. In other words, the inability to attain 
perspective during difficult situations in part explains the heightened levels of distress 
reported by individuals high on anxious attachment. This finding is especially novel and 
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gives merit to the idea that perspective taking may be a potentially protective ER 
strategy.  
Although several proposed mediations were not supported in this study, the 
majority of the hypothesized direct paths between variables were significant. The 
proposed mediations may be worth looking into further, especially when considering that 
issues with measurement affected the way in which certain variables of interest (e.g., 
hyperactivating strategies; wellbeing) were modeled. For instance, hyperactivating 
strategies did not hold up as a latent construct comprised of multiple measures of 
rumination, and was turned into an observed variable that consisted of only one short 
measure of rumination during analysis. It’s possible that mediation could be detected if 
other hyperactivating strategies, like exaggeration of threats of hypervigilance to cues of 
abandonment, were also part of the latent factor.  
Lastly, life stress did not significantly moderate any of the proposed mediations. 
However, in the presence of high life stress, there was a trend towards mediation whereby 
hyperactivating strategies (i.e., rumination) appeared to explain the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and wellbeing. This suggests that increased use of hyperactivating ER 
strategies during times of high life stress may in part explain low levels of wellbeing 
reported by individuals high on attachment anxiety.  
While the results provided little evidence for the predicted moderations by life 
stress, these predictions warrant further investigation. In addition to the nearly significant 
path, it’s likely that the way in which life stress was measured obscured the actual 
relationships: Rather than assessing solely for the types of events likely to trigger 
attachment-related distress (i.e., interpersonal events), the measure used took a broad 
range of life stressors into account.  
For instance, an individual could have had a very high level of life stress due to 
endorsing experiences like a car wreck, failing a class, or losing a job—none of which are 
thought to be attachment-related threats. What is also likely is that this study lacked the 
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power (i.e., not a large enough sample size) needed to detect moderated mediations with 
a latent variable moderator.  
Perspective taking.   
Perspective taking was a central construct of interest in this study and results 
regarding direct associations with attachment and mental health were all as predicted. 
Most notable is that perspective taking partially mediated the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and distress, which provides relatively strong preliminary evidence 
that perspective taking is a protective ER strategy (i.e., is associated with positive 
psychological outcomes). These findings also support the notion that perspective taking 
may be a way of regulating emotions that is a natural consequence of healthy early 
relationships.  It makes sense that children who experience ordinary attachment-related 
distress and/or conflicts and are consistently met with the appropriate level of support 
would form the belief that negative feelings are not in themselves dangerous, and 
importantly, are temporary. In adulthood, this may manifest as feeling as though one does 
not need to alter and/or escape emotional discomfort, as the attachment secure individual 
seems to have internalized that negative feelings are tolerable and even inevitable. It 
makes sense that such an orientation towards distress would lead to an ability to appraise 
situations in a balanced manner and be flexible in approaching life’s challenges.  
It’s also relevant to consider why those high on anxious and/or avoidant 
attachment reported an inverse relationship with perspective taking. Consistent with 
attachment theory, one plausible unifying theme is that individuals with insecure 
attachment styles are less confident in their ability to tolerate emotional pain (an ability 
that characterizes perspective taking). This makes sense when considering that both types 
of insecure attachment are associated with the presence of a primary caregiver who is 
unable to respond to the child in a manner that would cultivate such confidence in the 
child’s ability to cope with emotional discomfort.    
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Another speculation consistent with attachment theory is that individuals high on 
anxious attachment and individuals high on avoidant attachment doubt their ability to 
tolerate distress for distinct reasons. In the case of avoidant attachment, a dismissive or 
punitive attachment figure imparts the idea that expressing distress is futile and/or 
dangerous, and thus the child develops strategies for avoiding the experience of distress. 
It is reasonable to assume that ideas inherent to perspective taking are in opposition to the 
attachment avoidant individuals’ mindset, which assumes one must prevent contact with 
distressing emotions to ensure survival, whereas perspective taking involves an open 
approach to experiencing the gamut of emotions. Another likely consequence of 
attachment avoidance is impairment in emotional awareness: Through efforts to prevent 
emotional discomfort, attachment avoidant individuals may consequently become 
chronically detached from their own inner-experience and consequently experience 
difficulty accessing and identifying emotions (Fantini-Hauwel, Boudoukha, & 
Arciszewski, 2012). As engagement with and understanding of emotional experience is 
vital to perspective taking, it makes sense that this characteristic of attachment avoidance 
also contributes to difficulties with perspective taking.  
In contrast, individuals high on anxious attachment may not engage in perspective 
taking because their formative experiences with an attachment figure were confusing and 
inconsistent. Because the attachment figure was sometimes available and sometimes not, 
the child maintained the belief that attachment needs could be met. However, the child 
may have resorted to exaggerated displays of distress in an effort to attain the attention of 
the caregiver. The belief that appears to carry into adulthood and is consistent with 
attachment theory is that in order to have needs met, distress must be not only maintained 
but also magnified. This is also in opposition to perspective taking, which is 
characterized by approaching negative emotions and situations in a flexible and balanced 
manner. Further, perspective taking is in part characterized by individuals’ ability to 
regulate their own levels of distress, likely resulting in more brief, mild experiences of 
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distress—which is also theoretically contradictory to the orientation of the attachment 
anxious individual (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).  
Experiential avoidance.  
Experiential avoidance (EA) is another approach to ER that is yet to be fully 
understood, but evidence thus far has made a case for its important role in the 
development and maintenance of psychological difficulties (Hayes et al., 1996; 2004). In 
this study, EA was treated as a multifaceted construct characterized by tendencies to stay 
out of contact with distressing thoughts, feelings, and situations, as well as strong 
underlying beliefs that to be happy means to never experience pain (Gamez et al., 2011). 
It was thought that multiple proposed facets of EA would comprise a single construct; 
However, only three of six measured components of EA held up in a factor analysis. 
The avoidance of engaging in behaviors that pose a risk of eliciting negative 
emotions, the belief that pain is unbearable and precludes happiness, and feeling 
emotionally numb and/or unable to identify emotions represented EA in this study based 
on their ability to form a single construct. Engaging in thought suppression and 
distraction, putting off potentially uncomfortable tasks, and having a low tolerance for 
distress did not emerge as representative of EA as a whole. 
This finding made sense upon further investigation: The three facets of EA that 
did not converge with the other facets seem to be somewhat more ordinary and less 
noxious tendencies. For instance, procrastination and distraction, while problematic when 
applied pervasively, are relatively common and harmless behaviors. Similarly, low 
distress tolerance is not quite as pathological as it sounds: Items that assess for this, like 
“I am willing to suffer for the things that matter to me” and “When working on 
something important, I won’t quit even if things get difficult,” allude to a resiliency that 
is not likely to be observed in the majority of people but rather in a somewhat smaller 
subset of individuals.  
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In contrast, the three facets of EA that comprised a single construct appear to be 
more detrimental to overall functioning. For instance, behavioral avoidance not only 
requires a great deal of effort, but it also prohibits individuals from encountering 
situations that may lead to growth and makes it unlikely that the individual will learn that 
distress is tolerable. The same seems true for the underlying belief that experiencing pain 
equates to the extinction of happiness—ironically, in an effort to increase chances of 
happiness, one avoids experiences that pose the risk of getting hurt but that potentially 
essential to fulfillment and joy (e.g., asking someone out on a date). It’s possible that a 
consequence of this sort of lack of engagement with life can lead to emotional numbing. 
In ensuring that no pain is felt, one might also ensure that nothing else at all is felt. In 
sum, these three facets of EA seem to be not only more problematic than the former, but 
are also more in line with how attachment theory explains the tendencies of those high on 
attachment avoidance.   
While EA was associated with attachment avoidance as expected, it was not 
associated with wellbeing (contrary to predictions). There are a number of possibilities 
that may explain this. First and as previously mentioned, wellbeing was represented only 
by positive affect, whereas attachment theory posits the lack of wellbeing observed in 
attachment avoidant individuals is likely explained by a lack of close relationships (the 
measure of close relationships, emotional ties, did not demonstrate adequate 
psychometrics and was thus excluded from the analysis). Also consistent with attachment 
theory is that individuals high on avoidant attachment may, as a consequence of 
emotional suppression, not be particularly psychologically aware. If this were the case, it 
would be expected that attachment avoidant individuals would be unable to accurately 
self-report about their emotional experiences.  
Two other inconsistencies emerged in the findings related to EA: First, 
individuals high on attachment anxiety reported utilizing EA as an ER strategy. It’s 
possible that attachment anxious individuals may rely on EA to quell distress when 
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hyperactivating strategies fail to quell attachment anxiety. Further, because both 
attachment anxious and attachment avoidant individuals reported using EA to regulate 
emotions, it’s likely that EA functions differently for the two groups. Those who are high 
on attachment avoidance may rely on EA consistently, resulting in emotional numbness, 
whereas those high on attachment anxiety may rely on EA as a last resort when 
hyperactivating strategies fail. Second, EA was associated with distress, which was not 
initially predicted. This might be explained by the nature of EA itself—while EA has 
been shown to diminish negative emotions in the short-term, a “rebound effect” has also 
been observed, such that EA is only able to keep distress at bay for so long (Hayes et al., 
1996, 2004). As EA may only be sustainable for a short-time, the distressing emotions 
become present again—possibly even stronger than before. 
Strengths and Limitations  
Strengths.  
The current study was unique in a number of ways and produced novel findings 
regarding the mediating role of emotion regulation in the relationship between adult 
attachment and mental health. In general, the study focused largely on a potential 
protective ER strategy (i.e., perspective taking). The use of SEM allowed for a more 
nuanced understanding of perspective taking, finding that it is seemingly comprised of 
multiple, similar ER strategies like big picture appraisal, cognitive reappraisal, and 
cognitive flexibility. This suggests that it may be more accurate to treat these constructs 
as one variable (i.e., perspective taking) rather than as individual constructs.   
The study also found that perspective taking partially mediates the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress, an entirely novel finding that suggests an 
inability to attain perspective may in part explain the heightened levels of distress 
reported by attachment anxious individuals. This finding may also contribute to 
meaningful clinical implications, such as teaching perspective taking skills to those with 
insecure attachment styles to promote psychological health. 
 79 
    Further, the use of SEM also allowed for a deeper probe into the nature of 
experiential avoidance. Results confirmed that EA is indeed multifaceted, but that it is 
also uniquely related to attachment style and mental health. Overall, these findings 
regarding EA suggest that it is a more complex construct than previously thought, and 
that it potentially has explanatory power in the relationship between adult attachment and 
mental health.  
The use of SEM additionally allowed for multiple, competing models to be tested. 
In other words, the hypothesized model was not immediately accepted despite numerous 
significant paths that confirmed predictions. Model fit indices, modification indices, and 
conceptual knowledge were used together to determine when respecification of paths 
were necessary and, ultimately, to arrive at the model that best fit the data.  
Limitations.  
While the results of the current study are promising, some limitations and 
precautions in interpreting the data must be acknowledged. First, the study was cross-
sectional, such that data were collected and analyzed from the sample at one specific 
point in time. While this type of design is common and acceptable, stronger inferences 
can be made with an experimental design. Further, when testing for mediation, time 
precedence is essential for results to be interpreted as “true” mediations. In the case of 
this particular study, this would have meant the same participants taking three separate 
surveys with appropriate gaps in time between administrations, with the first survey 
assessing for attachment styles, the second for emotion regulation, and the third for 
mental health variables. Thus, the partial mediation found in this study is considered 
preliminary evidence and replication with time precedence is necessary in order to draw 
strong conclusions.  
Another limitation is that both the measurement and structural part of the model 
were extensively respecified. Although respecification is nearly always a part of SEM, 
it’s widely agreed that when respecification is somewhat substantial, results should be 
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considered exploratory. Thus, the model needs to be replicated in a separate sample to 
further support the findings. Another consideration is that a primary strength of latent 
variable modeling is its unique ability to estimate the associations among variables with 
substantially less measurement error than in traditional regression. Because this model 
became partially latent (i.e., included observed variables) after respecification, it’s 
possible that this contributed to measurement error.  
 Lastly, he final model consisted solely of self-report measures. Bias in 
responding to self-report measures has been shown to exist to some degree most of the 
time and typically manifests as a desire to present oneself in a more positive light 
(Robinson & Neighbors, 2006; Paulhus & John, 1998).  To account for this, a cognitive 
processing measure, the BPA-SST, was administered in the study. Unfortunately, the 
measure did not load onto its respective factor and could not be included in the model. 
Although one would expect a different measure of the same construct to be at least 
moderately related, it’s not uncommon for measures with distinct formats to perform 
quite differently (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). This is also true for the 
measure of attachment used: While the ECRS possesses the best psychometric properties 
of self-report measures of attachment, it is not considered to be as accurate or powerful as 
the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI). Reasons the interview was not used are discussed 
in the literature review.  
Future directions  
As mentioned above, the considerable amount of model respecification, or 
changes to the proposed relationships, resulted in the analyses being somewhat 
exploratory. Given this, it is a priority to test the final model in a separate sample in order 
to strengthen the conclusions of this study. Another important consideration for the future 
is to use time precedence such that attachment style, emotion regulation, and mental 
health are measured separately from one another and at three distinct, theoretically 
appropriate points in time. For example, individuals would first respond to the measure of 
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attachment style. Two weeks later, the same individuals would respond to emotion 
regulation questionnaires, and two weeks after that, they would complete measures of 
mental health. This change would allow for any mediations found to be considered “true” 
mediations.  
It is also important that the measures used to capture the constructs of interest are 
reconsidered and a more parsimonious approach to measurement is used. For instance, 
including multiple measures of similar constructs may not be necessary if one measure is 
identified that can adequately capture the construct of interest. In the current study, the 
EQ_R was included to assess for rumination. However, results suggested this 
questionnaire was not measuring the same construct as the other measure of rumination, 
the RRS. Upon further investigation, it was clear that the RRS was capturing rumination 
as the study intended—a tendency to repetitively think about the causes and 
consequences of one’s negative emotional experience (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991)—while 
the EQ_R was assessing for an individual’s overall tendency towards introspection.  
Similarly, the measure of distress and wellbeing used (MHI) did not appear to 
assess for wellbeing and distress as broadly as these constructs were conceptualized in 
the study (e.g., distress was represented only by anxiety and depression in the MHI and 
wellbeing was represented only by positive affect and quality of close relationships). 
Alternatively, a measure that captures the aforementioned dimensions in addition to other 
relative facets of distress (i.e., loneliness, irritability, shame) and wellbeing (i.e., 
fulfillment, purposefulness) should be considered for use in future studies.  
Also worth considering is that hyperactivating approaches to emotion regulation 
were represented by a single construct, rumination, while it’s likely that multiple 
hyperactivating strategies exist and that many of these strategies are behavioral. In the 
future, an appropriate measure of behavior should be included that assesses for how often 
an individual engages in various emotion upregulating behaviors (i.e., exaggerated 
displays of emotion; frequent and intense conflicts; acting out for attention). Other 
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hyperactivating approaches, such as hypervigilance to cues of abandonment and 
exaggeration of threats, should also be assessed for. This kind of careful consideration of 
measurement will ensure that constructs of interest are accurately represented and ideally 
will result in fewer changes to the proposed model (e.g., fewer measures will need to be 
left out of analysis).   
Implications 
The current study adds weight to the claim that attachment continues to influence 
mental health throughout the lifespan. While attachment style is thought to be capable of 
changing based on adult relationships, including experiences in psychotherapy, the 
current medical model does not favor the long-term work that is often necessary to elicit 
this type of change. Given this limitation, it may be beneficial to target emotion 
regulation in individuals with insecure attachment styles. Given that emotion regulation is 
already a component of many psychotherapies, tailoring the emotion regulation work to 
the individual’s unique attachment style could be more fruitful than a “one size fits all” 
approach.  
This study also has implications for how we understand the behaviors and 
presentations unique to each of the attachment styles. For instance, it’s long been known 
that insecure attachment styles are associated with problematic approaches to managing 
emotion. However, this relationship has not been explicitly delineated. Revealing the 
nuances of attachment-related behaviors allows for a deeper understanding of the 
individual and the individual’s motivations. This could also contribute to our 
understanding of how to best approach psychotherapy and tailor the approach to the 
individual.   
Conclusion 
Overall, results of the current study supported the widely accepted notion that 
insecure attachment styles result in psychological difficulties and secure attachment 
styles lead to positive psychological outcomes. However, a body of theoretical and 
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empirical work suggests that attachment style does not exert its influence on mental 
health directly but rather does so through a number of mediating variables. This study 
provided evidence for the potential explanatory role of emotion regulation in the 
relationship between attachment style and mental health.   
Previous findings that individuals high on anxious attachment engage in 
hyperactivating ER strategies and that individuals high on avoidant attachment engage in 
deactivating ER strategies were replicated. Moreover, evidence was found in support of 
the idea that individuals low on attachment anxiety and/or attachment avoidance engage 
in perspective taking, a flexible and balanced approach to managing emotions, while 
those high on attachment anxiety and/or avoidance do not.   
Most compelling was the finding that the absence of perspective taking in 
individuals high on anxious attachment partially mediated heightened levels of distress. 
That an inability to take perspective in part explained the heightened levels of distress 
reported by attachment anxious individuals suggests not only that perspective taking is 
potentially a protective ER strategy, but also that building perspective taking skills may 
mitigate some of the emotional difficulties attachment anxious individuals report. A 
continued focus on the mediating role of emotion regulation within this paradigm could 
have significant implications for understanding how best to approach insecure attachment 
styles in adulthood. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Demographic Questions 
 
1. What is your sex? 
 
2. What is your age? 
 
3. Are you currently in a relationship?   
 
4. Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity?  
 
African-American/Black (please specify ethnic group if applicable) 
Hispanic-American/Latino/Chicano (please specify ethnic group if applicable) 
Native-American (please specify ethnic group if applicable) 
Asian-American (please specify ethnic group if applicable) 
South-Asian American or Pacific Islander (please specify ethnic group if applicable)  
Caucasian/European-American (please specify ethnic group if applicable)  
Middle Eastern/Arab-American (please specify ethnic group) 
Biracial or Multiracial (please specify ethnic groups) 
Other (please specify) 
 
5. Please estimate your family's current total household income (the family you grew 
up with):  
 
Between $0 and $25,000 
Between $25,001 and $65,000 
Between $65,001 and $120,000 
Greater than $120,000 
 
6. Were you born in the US? 
 
7. If you were not born in the US, where were you born? 
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Appendix B  
 
The Scrambled Sentences Test for Big Picture Appraisal (SST-BPA) 
Participants are asked to unscramble the following sentences (choosing 5 of the 6 words) 
in order to form statements.  
1 mostly others to I’m similar not  
2 can I learn fear cannot from 
3 think I pain lasting is temporary 
4 badly people often few all feel 
5 doesn’t me suffering wiser make does 
6 weird I normal think I am 
7 seldom most bad feel people often 
8 quickly painful cannot shift can emotions 
9 my weak human show faults I’m 
10 don’t me do difficult damage situations\ 
11 like everyone has none feelings me 
12 sadness tends linger pass always to 
13 do learn I don’t failures from 
14 experience few other many failure people 
15 believe I shameful human is sadness  
16 to end seems anxiety always never 
17 unlike really other am I like 
18 things time do don’t with improve  
19 happens rejection some people all to 
20 sadness cannot from learn can I  
21 people insecurities have do all don’t 
22 problems grown I have from haven’t 
23 lasting is long suffering isn’t often 
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24 happen to painful me events everyone 
25 experiences cannot me can teach painful 
26 unusual people rejection all experience do 
27 stay does usually distress doesn’t around 
28 last moods to seem pass bad 
29 me painful do experiences don’t benefit 
30 means mistakes normal making flawed I’m  
31 sadness doesn’t lessons bring valuable does 
32 other no scared many feel people 
33 fairly I’m not think I typical 
34 moods away go do bad don’t 
35 are feelings my definitely universal not 
36 failure my indicate humanness can worth 
37 learn I rejection may from won’t 
38 inappropriate having is clearly human anxiety  
39 nervous often people feel few all  
40 don’t always better do things get  
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Appendix C  
 
Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire 
 
Directions: 
Please think back to times when you have felt upset or unhappy.  Many different 
situations provoke such feelings (e.g., when you felt you had failed or did not live up to 
your own or others' expectations, or when you experienced a loss, or felt rejected), and 
the emotions involved may vary (e.g., hurt, anger, sadness, grief, jealousy).  Rate each of 
the following items on a scale from 1 to 5 to indicate how often you have had thoughts 
similar to those listed. 
 
Response Scale: 
 
              1-----------------2------------------3-------------------4-------------------5 
         Never                  Rarely             Sometimes         Frequently                Very  
                                                                                      Frequently 
Stem: 
When I am upset or unhappy… 
 
1. I remember that other aspects of my life are going better.  
2. I remind myself that I will grow from this experience.  
3. I know that other areas of my life are going okay.  
4. I remind myself that painful experiences are a part of everyone's life.  
5. I know I will be able to come to terms with this.  
6. I reflect on how people I know have gone through similar situations.  
7. I know this situation will teach me things.  
8. I understand that the situation will look different to me after some time passes.  
9. I view this as a part of life's lessons.  
10. I stay aware of what I can do well.  
11. I find inspiration in other people's experiences.  
12. it feels like I will be wiser from this.  
13. I remind myself that what I am experiencing is something everyone feels.  
14. I know there is value in painful experiences.  
15. I remind myself that I have felt this bad before and come out of it.  
16. I know that this is only part of my life.  
17. I realize that I will learn from this.  
18. I am aware that other people often feel the way that I do.  
19. I remind myself that suffering is part of life.  
20. I know there is value in experiencing my emotions fully.  
21. I remind myself that everyone suffers sometimes.  
22. I know that others share experiences like mine.  
23. I know that there are many ways to view the difficult situation 
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Appendix D 
 
           Experiences Questionnaire (EQ) 
 
Please use the following scale to answer the items listed below. 
 
Never                       All the time 
1                         2                         3                         4                         5 
 
 
1. I think about what will happen in the future 
2. I remind myself that thoughts aren’t facts. 
3. I am better able to accept myself as I am.  
4. I notice all sorts of little things and details in the world around me. 
5. I am kinder to myself when things go wrong.  
6. I can slow my thinking at times of stress.  
7. I wonder what kind of person I really am. 
8. I am not so easily carried away by my thoughts and feelings.  
9. I notice that I don’t take difficulties so personally.  
10. I can separate myself from my thoughts and feelings.  
11. I analyze why things turn out the way they do. 
12. I can take time to respond to difficulties.  
13. I think over and over again about what others have said to me. 
14. I can treat myself kindly.  
15. I can observe unpleasant feelings without being drawn into them.  
16. I have the sense that I am fully aware of what is going on around me and inside 
me. 
17. I can actually see that I am not my thoughts. 
18. I am consciously aware of a sense of my body as a whole.  
19. I think about the ways in which I am different from other people. 
20. I view things from a wider perspective.  
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                 Appendix E  
 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ)  
 
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire is designed to assess individual differences in the 
habitual use of two emotion regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisal and expressive 
suppression. 
 
Instructions and Items 
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how 
you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve 
two distinct aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what 
you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your 
emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following 
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, 
please answer using the following scale: 
 
1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6----------
--------7 
strongly           neutral                                                                    
strongly 
disagree                                                                                                                                                             
agree 
 
1. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement)   
 I change what I’m thinking about. 
2. I keep my emotions to myself. 
3. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I   
 change what I’m thinking about. 
4. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
5. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in   
 a way that helps me stay calm. 
6. I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
7. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking  
 about the situation. 
8. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m   
 in. 
9. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
10.       When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking   
 about the situation. 
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Appendix F  
 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI) 
 
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. 
 
       1       2   3  4         5     6          7   
Strongly       Disagree        Somewhat      Neutral Somewhat      Agree       Strongly 
 Disagree           Disagree         Agree      Agree 
 
1. I am good at “sizing up” situations.  
2. I consider multiple options before making a decision.  
3. I like to look at difficult situations from many different angles. 
4. I seek additional information not immediately available before attributing causes 
to behavior. 
5. I try to think about things from another person’s point of view. 
6. I am good at putting myself in others’ shoes. 
7. It is important to look at difficult situations from many angles.  
8. When in difficult situations, I consider multiple options before deciding how to 
behave. 
9. I often look at a situation from different viewpoints. 
10. I consider all available facts and information when attributing causes to behavior.  
11. When I encounter difficult situations, I stop and try to think of several ways to 
resolve it.  
12. I can think of more than one way to resolve a difficult situation I’m confronted 
with.  
13. I consider multiple options before responding to difficult situations.	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
                                                  Appendix G 
 
Mental Health Inventory (MHI) 
 
Items are scored on a likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very often). 
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Appendix H 
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Appendix I  
 
Rumination Scale  
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of 
the items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost 
always think or do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what 
you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
 1 almost never 2 sometimes 3 often 4 almost always 
 
1. think about how alone you feel 
2. think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this” 
3. think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness 
4. think about how hard it is to concentrate 
5. think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 
6. think about how passive and unmotivated you feel. 
7. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed 
8. think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore 
9. think “Why can’t I get going?” 
10. think “Why do I always react this way?” 
11. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way 
12. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it 
13. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 
14. think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.” 
15. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” 
16. think “Why can’t I handle things better?” 
17. think about how sad you feel. 
18. think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes 
19. think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything 
20. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed 
21.go someplace alone to think about your feelings 
22. think about how angry you are with yourself 
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Appendix J 
 
The Experiences in Close Relationships Questionnaire- Revised  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down. 
I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner. 
I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on romantic partners. 
I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners. 
I don't feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners. 
I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners. 
I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close. 
I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner. 
It's not difficult for me to get close to my partner. 
I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner. 
It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need. 
I tell my partner just about everything. 
I talk things over with my partner. 
I am nervous when partners get too close to me. 
I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners. 
I find it easy to depend on romantic partners. 
It's easy for me to be affectionate with my partner. 
My partner really understands me and my needs.  
 
 
I'm afraid that I will lose my partner's love. 
I often worry that my partner will not want to stay with me. 
I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me. 
I worry that romantic partners won’t care about me as much as I care about them. 
I often wish that my partner's feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for him 
or her. 
I worry a lot about my relationships. 
When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become interested in 
someone else. 
When I show my feelings for romantic partners, I'm afraid they will not feel the same 
about me. 
I rarely worry about my partner leaving me. 
My romantic partner makes me doubt myself. 
I do not often worry about being abandoned. 
I find that my partner(s) don't want to get as close as I would like. 
Sometimes romantic partners change their feelings about me for no apparent reason. 
My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away. 
I'm afraid that once a romantic partner gets to know me, he or she won't like who I 
really am. 
It makes me mad that I don't get the affection and support I need from my partner. 
I worry that I won't measure up to other people. 
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Table 1. Demographic and socioeconomic indicators of study participants (N=585) 
            Variable                            n Frequency (%)    M SD 
      
Age 
Gender  
585  20.7 1.7 
   Female 300 51.3   
   Male 285 48.7   
Race/Ethnicity      
   African-American/Black 34 5.8   
   Hispanic-American/Latino/Chicano 109 18.6   
   Native-American 1 0.2   
   Asian-American 136 23.2   
   Caucasian/ European-American 268 45.8   
   Middle Eastern/Arab-American 13 2.2   
   Multiracial 20 3.4   
   Other 4 0.7   
International Student       
   Yes  25 4.2   
    No   560 95.8   
Socioeconomic Status     
   Working Class 84 14.4   
   Middle Class 224 38.3   
   Upper Middle Class 230 39.3   
   Upper Class 44 7.5   
   Other 3 0.5   
Currently in a Romantic/Intimate Relationship      
   Yes 260 44.4   
   No 269 46.0   
   It’s complicated  56 9.6   
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Table 2. Perceived socioeconomic status (N=585) 
Participant Response                 n Frequency (%) 
1 “Worst off”  0 0 
2 4 .7 
3 20 3.4 
4 43 7.4 
5 “Average” 75 12.8 
6 104 17.8 
7 172 29.4 
8 119 20.3 
9 39 6.7 
10 “Best off”  9 1.5 
Note. Survey responses ranged from “1” worst off to “10” best off based on income,  
education, and jobs. Thus, higher values represent higher perceived socioeconomic status.  
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Table 3. Correlations, means, and standard deviations among observed variables (N=585) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable M  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.BPAQ 82.20 16.96 - .62** .37** -.13** -.18** -.13** .14** -.16** -.36** -.16** .57** .52** -.27** -.27** -.28** .50** -.21** -.23** 
2.EQ_D 44.31 8.38  - .34** -.12** -.13** -.19** .14** -.13** -.39** -.27** .59** .54** -.34** -.32** -.34** .50** -.24** -.14** 
3.EQ_R 22.62 3.77   - .05 .14** .09* .13** -.03 -.27** .19** .30** .53** .04 .06 -.04 .15** .13** -.13** 
4.MEAQ_BA 37.07 9.17    - .67** .45** .50** .59** .18** .34** -.11** -.14** .42** .31** .40** -.07 .29** .16** 
5.MEAQ_DA 44.45 10.87     - .31** .50** .55** .09* .43** -.13** -.15** .38** .38** .43** -.12** .29** .10* 
6.MEAQ_P 26.31 6.32      - .23**   .39** .16** .41** -.14** -.03 .32** .35** .29** -.19** .25** .07* 
7.MEAQ_DS 26.16 5.71       - .32** -.17** .24** .24** .10* .16** .12** .13** .22** .11** -.06 
8.MEAQ_RD 39.40 11.44        - .21** .37** -.10* -.23** .38** .36** -54** -.18** .28** .33** 
9.MEAQ_DE 31.24 8.56         - .08 -.35** -.41** .15** .13** .29** -.47** .10* .24** 
10.RRS 51.52 14.02          - -.20** -.07 .54** .62** .55** -.25** .44** .12** 
11.CFI 69.04 12.77           - .45** -.27** -.26** -.28** .46** -.14** -.21** 
12.MHI_A 27.56 7.90            - -.26** -.18** -.28** .33** -.13** -.22** 
13.MHI_D 16.91 5.33             - .71** .69** -.27** .40** .13** 
14.MHI_BC 21.59 6.64              - .72** -.35** .37** .18** 
15.MHI_PA 34.04 6.98               - -.36** .40** .28** 
16.EQRS_1 3.89 1.36                - -.23** -.26** 
17.EQRS_2 3.43 1.27                 - .40** 
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Table 3 (Continued)  
 
Note.*  p < .05; ** p < .01  
Note.*  BPAQ= Big Picture Appraisal Questionnaire; EQ_D = Experiences Questionnaire, Decentering ; EQ_R = Experiences Questionnaire, Rumination ; 
MEAQ _BA = Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire, Behavioral Avoidance; MEAQ _DA = Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance 
Questionnaire, Distress Aversion ; MEAQ _P = Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire, Procrastination ; MEAQ _DS = Multidimensional 
Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire, Distraction/Suppression ; MEAQ_RD = Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire, Repression/Denial ; 
MEAQ _DE = Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire, Distress Endurance; RRS= Ruminative Response Scale; CFI = Cognitive Flexibility 
Inventory ; MHI_A= Mental Health Inventory, Anxiety; MHI_D= Mental Health Inventory, Depression; MHI_BC= Mental Health Inventory, Loss of Behavioral 
Control; MHI_PA= Mental Health Inventory, Positive Affect;  EQRS_1 = Experiences in Close Relationships Scale, Attachment Anxiety; EQRS_2 = 
Experiences in Close Relationships Scale, Attachment Avoidance.    
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Table 4. Fit indices for competitive model testing 
Model    c2 df CFI RMSEA CI 90% 
Model A  530.48 68 .874  .108 .099 - .116 
Model B  331.70 62 .927  .086 .077 - .095 
    
Model Comparison    c2 difference df difference Significance testing 
Model A vs. Model B  198.777 6 p= .000 
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Table 5. Factor loadings across all latent constructs (N=585)  
Construct  Loading p 
   
Perspective Taking    
     Big Picture Appraisal (BPAQ) .78 .000 
     Self-Distancing (EQ-D) .81 .000 
     Cognitive Flexibility (CFI) .66 .000 
     Reappraisal (ERQ-R) .72 .000 
    Scrambled Sentences Test for BPA (SST-BPA) .27 .000 
   
Deactivating Strategies (Experiential Avoidance)    
      Behavioral Avoidance  .84 .000 
      Distress Aversion .79 .000 
      Repression and Denial  .70 .000 
      Procrastination .43 .000 
      Distraction and Suppression .52 .000 
      Distress Endurance .38 .000 
   
   
Distress    
      Depression  .86 .000 
      Anxiety .81 .000 
      Loss of Behavioral Control .84 .000 
   
   
   
Note. Factor loadings presented are standardized. Factors and indicators included in the final 
model appear in bold.  
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Table 6. Tests of indirect effects (N=585) 
                                         Mplus estimate of  
                                            indirect effects                   Sobel test 
                                     __________________              _________ 
Path                                               Indirect       Direct        Total          z         p 
Attachment Anxiety àPerspective Taking àDistress           .04***       .10***      .14***      2.22     .03* 
Attachment Anxietyà RuminationàDistress                            .19***       .10***        .29***      -         - 
Attachment Anxietyà Experiential AvoidanceàDistress          .09***      .10***       .19***       -         - 
Attachment Anxietyà Perspective TakingàWellbeing            -.10***      -.02            -.12           -         -  
Attachment Anxietyà RuminationàWellbeing                        -.05**        -.02            -.07           -         - 
Attachment Anxietyà Experiential Avoidance àWellbeing      .02            -.02           -.00            -         - 
Attachment Avoidanceà Perspective TakingàWellbeing        -.11***     -.11***      -.22***      -         - 
Attachment Avoidanceà Experiential AvoidanceàWellbeing   .01           -.11***      -.10           -         - 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Bold paths highlight significant evidence or trends suggestive of partial mediation. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. † p < .10. 
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Table 7. Wald tests of parameter constraints for multiple group analysis (N=585) 
Path WSdiff df p 
Attachment AnxietyàPerspective TakingàDistress  2.84 1 .091 
Attachment AnxietyàDeactivatingàDistress 0.06 1 .815 
Attachment AnxietyàHyperactivatingàDistress 0.06 1 .802 
Attachment Anxiety àPerspective TakingàWellbeing 3.02 1 .082 
Attachment Anxiety àDeactivatingàWellbeing  0.02 1 .878 
Attachment Anxiety àHyperactivatingàWellbeing 7.06 1 .008 
Attachment Avoidance àPerspective TakingàWellbeing 1.62 1 .204 
Attachment Avoidance àDeactivatingàWellbeing 0.05 1 .826 
Attachment Avoidance àPerspective TakingàDistress 0.31 1 .575 
Attachment Avoidance àDeactivatingàDistress  2.25 1 .133 
Note. Paths that trended towards significant appear in bold.  
Note. A conservative p value of .005 was used to adjust for pairwise error when testing for significance. 
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Figure 1. Proposed Model 
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Figure 2. Final Modified Model  
 
Dashed lines represent nonsignificant paths. Solid lines represent significant paths.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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